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THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND THE CONCEPT
OF LEGALITY IN EAST GERMANY*
OTTO KIRCHHEIMERt
WITHIN the Soviet orbit of Eastern European states, the East German
Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik or DDR) occupies
a rather atypical place.' The policy of its administration serves a dual pur-
pose. First, it aims at speedy integration with the other Communist-directed
countries and furthers as much social change as that process requires. In
addition, it is expected to pave the way for the eventual absorption of all
Germany into the Eastern world. Hence, the pace of integration into the
Eastern bloc is not simply conditioned by the prevailing economic and social
situation, but is also subject to counterchecks in that a kind of ideological
competition with Western Germany's Federal Republic somehow remains
on the agenda.
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1. For a recent study of the legal system of Soviet Russia itself, see Berman, Soviet
Law Reform-Datelte Moscow 1957, 66 YALE L.J. 1191 (1957). This article, especially
valuable for its searching exploitation of colloquial statements by Soviet legal authorities,
rests on the implied thesis that Soviet juridical performance somehow may be traced to
a dichotomy between legality and force, and that their respective provinces are dependent
on the pressures and circumstances of the moment. In the light of this thesis, the present
period-with inevitable deviations and countercurrents-could be considered as one of ex-
panding legality, a development made possible by the fact that "a totalitarian system of
government which operates by despotic methods in politics can create a legal order
which operates with considerable stability and independence in matters considered non-
political." Id. at 1212 n.75.
But whether Professor Berman's dichotomy, applicable as it might be to other systems,
is a meaningful point of departure for analyzing the Communist concept of legality and
the functioning of its judicial machinery, is not so clear. Legality (zakonost') -in Com-
munist parlance has a complementary or possibly counterconcept: partiinost.! This
untranslatable term denotes both the party-subservient quality of ideas and institutions
and the party allegiances of men.
Understanding how the legality-force or political-nonpolitical dichotomy relates to
the presuppositions underlying the interplay between legality and partiinwst' is fundamental
to comprehending the Communist "rule of law." This Article will study some facets
of that relationship under the judicial administration of a territory which, since the end of
World War II, has formed an integral part of the Communist political system.
2. The curtain separating the two parts of Germany is not tightly drawn. Private
individuals constantly cross the border for visits; citizens of East Germany have been
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Eastern integration and Western rivalry have produced contradictory effects.
No continuous sequence of bloody purges in the ranks of the ruling party,
after the pattern of the USSR and the majority of its satellites, has cramped
the DDR's style; no show trials have announced a prefabricated alternative
reality; neither intraparty fighting over policy nor repercussions of party shifts
in Russia have duplicated Moscow trials, a fact repeatedly emphasized, with
caution but not without satisfaction, by Frau Hilde Benjamin, now at the helm
of the DDR Ministry of Justice.3 Nevertheless, dealing with a population
somewhat less submissive than that of some neighboring countries, DDR
rulers have at times felt less secure and have acted more harshly than their
colleagues abroad. Whenever the screws are tightened, there is a great deal more
hesitation about releasing them.
In spite of heavy borrowing from Soviet concepts of the judicial process,4
conditions peculiar to the Eastern Zone have impressed upon the DDR judicial
apparatus certain traits which give it a special flavor. The absence of what
may be called totalitarian extremism and, in contrast, an aversion to liberalizing
experiments help illuminate the political problems that inhere in any Sovietized
administration of justice. When the effects of both inordinately severe and lenient
tendencies are lacking, the typical stands out in bold relief.
THE INSTITUTIONS OF JUSTICE
Although the present organization of the dispensers and administrators of
justice in the DDR dates from the autumn of 1952,5 the statutes of that year only
elaborate patterns which were discernible long before. As early as 1950, various
postwar administrative organs had been dispensed with6 and their functions
transferred to the Ministry of Justice. A new High Court and an attorney
registering protest votes against the Government by transferring their domicile from the
jurisdiction of the Communist bosses to the greener pastures of the West German
Federal Republic. All this is not without influence on the DDR administration.
3. For the most recent example, see Editorial, Erqebnisse der Diskussion ieber die
Anwendung der STPO, 11 NEuE JusTiz [hereinafter cited as N.J.] 601 (1957). f
4. Borrowing is made easy. An official monthly, Rechtswissenschaftlicher Informa-
tionsdienst, prints most of the important Soviet (and other orbit) legal discussions; a
number of Soviet textbooks of law have been translated. Scholars are required to absorb
Soviet concepts and judges and prosecutors also may take notice. Occasionally embarrassing
incidents arise when a German translation comes off the press after the Soviet author-
for example, Andrey Yao Vishinskii-has just been removed from the pedestal.
5. The two main statutes, the one on court organization (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz
[hereinafter cited as G.V.G.]), [1952] Gesetzblatt der D.D.R. [hereinafter cited as
G.B.D.D.R.] 983, and the Code of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter cited as C.C.P.],
[1952] G.B.D.D.R. 996, carry the date of October 2, 1952; the statute on the organization
of the Prosecutor's Office (Staatsanwaltschaftsgesetz [hereinafter cited as S.A.S.]) ante-
dates them half a year, carrying the date of May 23, 1952, [1952] G.B.D.D.R. 408.
6. They were formally dissolved together with the state governments and state parlia-
ments by the "Law on the Further Democratization of the Organization and Working
Conditions of Public Bodies in the States of the D.D.R." of July 23, 1952, [1952] G.B.D.D.R.
613.
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general's office for the whole republic had been established as far back as 1949,
when the state was permitted to take its final shape.7 By 1952, the two principal
administrative agencies, the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Attorney
General," functioning separately, had clearly become the central focus for
directing activities in the legal field. Unlike the usual ministry of justice found in
continental democracies, these two agencies assumed much more than the usual
tasks of selecting judges and prosecutors, instructing the prosecuting staff,
doing part of the housekeeping job for the courts, and functioning as drafting
office for nonspecialized legislation. They became responsible for the satisfactory
functioning of the judicial order. They are the guarantors of the intellectual
content of the judiciary's output. They ensure that the courts will deliver
judgments in harmony with the goals of the administration. 9 In explaining the
organization of the various tribunals, in delineating their hierarchical relation-
ship, this role must constantly be kept in mind. The judicial hierarchy of the
East German Republic does not terminate in its highest tribunal, the High
Court, but extends beyond it and culminates in the two coordinated administra-
tive organs, the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General.' 0
Both ha e more or less formalized means at their disposal for influencing the
disposition of individual cases and directing the course of future legal decisions.
The lowest basic tribunal is the county, court, with at least one for each of the
217 counties. Large centers of population may have as many county courts as
there are city districts. Such a court consists of one professional judge and two
lay assessors," and has original jurisdiction over all criminal cases except those
specifically assigned to other courts.12 It has full jurisdiction over civil suits,
regardless of the amount involved, with the exception of controversies involving
property of public bodies in which the amount at issue exceeds DM 3,00.13
7. Lax% of Dec. 8. 1949, [19491 G.B.D.D.R. Ill.
8. Whilt: the Minister of Jutice holds cabinet rank, the Attorney General is elected
fur a fixed five-year term by the People's Chamber, S.A.S. § 3; however, this is a minor
difference since the Attorney General has no superior other than the Council of Ministers,
S.A.S. § 1; § 16(2) establishes his right to participate in the sessions of the Council of
Ministers.
9. Hoxdover, in one important field the Ministry of Justice has had to relinquish juris-
diction altogether. The prison services originally in its bailiwick passed into the hands of
the Ministry of the Interior in 1950. Decree of Nov. 16 1950, [1950] G.B.D.D.R. 1165,
now codified in C.C.P. § 336(1). The Attorney General's office exercises some general
control function over the execution of punishment and the pertinent services.
10. The point is hardly controversial. It was forcefully repeated recently when Hilde
Benjamin, the incumbent Minister of Justice, fought attempts to follow recent Soviet pat-
terns of decentralization in the administration of justice. Benjamin, Aktuelle Fragen der
Gericltsorganisation, in STAAT UND RECHT im LiCHTm DES GROSSEX OKTOBER 189 (1957).
11. G.V.G. § 43(1).
12. G.V.G. § 41(1).
13. G.V.G. § 42. However, as now authorized by G.V.G. § 9, access to the courts has
been closed in a number of important controversies: lawsuits between "people's" enterprises
belong before the State Contract Commission, Decrees of Dec. 6, 1951, [1951] G.B.D.D.R.
1143, June 11, 1953, [1953] 2 G.B.D.D.R. 854; damage claims against the state so far are not
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Registration of land titles, business firms and other associations, and guardian-
ship and orphans' affairs, traditionally handled by the local court, have, however,
been transferred to administrative agencies. Even so, the county courts handle
most of the DDR's legal business. Ninety-three per cent of all criminal and
ninety-nine per cent of all civil cases are tried in these courts.1
4
Next in line are fourteen district courts which exercise both original and
appellate jurisdiction. In civil matters, they function mostly as courts of appeal.'
Their original criminal jurisdiction embraces crimes against the DDR, murder,
and aggravated forms of economic crimes; the prosecutor may also upgrade
other offenses and bring them before these tribunals.' 6 As appellate courts, they
handle protests-that is, the prosecution's appeals-and defendants' appeals
from county court judgments.17 Ordinarily, a district court sits as a division
composed of one full-time judge and two lay assessors in cases of original
jurisdiction and three full-time judges in appellate cases.' s Each of the fourteen
district courts has a president who may in his discretion preside over any case.',
Otherwise, the distribution of cases among the judges and divisions remains
in the hands of each court's administrative unit. This unit leads an existence
apart from the judicial members; it receives its cues from and owes obedience
to the Ministry of Justice.
The High Court was established in 1949. After 1953, when its most colorful
and energetic member, Frau Benjamin, surrendered her job as vice president of
the court to become Minister of Justice, the court settled back to elaborate the
details of the official legal program and ceased to participate in charting the
DDR's overall legal course. Within its present framework, it still fulfills an
essential role: it transmits to the lower courts the messages of the administrative
agencies of justice. A given message may concern the introduction of a totally
new program or the rectification of some isolated but symptomatic mistake
spotted by the Ministry or the Attorney General's office. In this role, the High
Court neither advances governmental policy nor lags far behind it. Loyally
following official gyrations, the court tries to keep in line with changing require-
ments.
This highest court has both original and appellate jurisdiction. The field of
dealt with in any court; nor can the question of personal liability of the functionary in-
volved be established in court proceedings. Some administrations grant a certain amount
of indemnity on the basis of considerations of individual need. For a limited program
of reopening access to the courts, see Schreier, Gedanken zu einer geset-lichen Regelhng
der Staatshaflung, 12 N.J. 195-98 (1958).
14. The figures are given by Hilde Benjamin, Akheelle Fragen der Gerichtsorganisation,
in STAAT UND REcHT i, LIcHTE DES GROSSEN OxTOBER 203 (1957).
15. Original suits against People's Enterprises, even though admissible, would at
present lead to no practical result, as judgments could only be enforced with the consent
of a division of the Ministry of Interior.
16. G.V.G. § 49(1).
17. G.V.G. § 49(2).
18. G.V.G. §8 51(1), (3).
19. G.V.G. § 51(4).
[Vol. 68:705
LEGALITY IN EAST GERMANY
original jurisdiction over criminal cases is not determined in advance by the
law, but on an ad hoc basis by the Attorney General. 20 As an appellate tribunal,
the High Court considers protests, appeals and complaints against decisions
issued by the district courts sitting as courts of original jurisdiction.21 The
DDR thus has abolished the possibility of carrying appeals based on points of
law through two judicial levels-a long-standing but by no means uncontro-
versial German tradition. Instead, it opens for the State, but only for the State,
a new channel of attack upon final judgments. Borrowing from the Soviet
system and the criminal procedure of the Third Reich, the East German Republic
has instituted an extraordinary appeal. Both the Attorney General and the
President of the High Court may bring any civil or criminal case before a
plenary meeting of the court 22 within a year 23 from the date final judgment
has been issued, whether by a lower court or by a three-judge division of the
High Court itself. Such an extraordinary appeal, styled "cassation," may be
based on a simple error of law or on an allegation that the attacked decision is
"fundamentally incorrect so far as the sentencing is concerned."4 The pro-
ceedings upon extraordinary appeal usually are conducted in great haste, and
rarely exhaust the four-week limit provided for them in the code of criminal
procedure.25 The defendant, though permitted to be represented, is a passive
object of, rather than a participant in, the proceedings.2 6 Frequently, the court
will exercise its prerogative to enter a final judgment rather than send the
case back to a lower tribunal.
From the viewpoint of the Government, the extraordinary appeal has a major
advantage. By preserving the immutability of final judgments, the legal system
of the DDR theoretically allows discrete problems to be settled in a manner which
might not conform to the ever-shifting policies which characterize Communist
regimes. The extraordinary appeal reduces the inconvenience that might arise
from such a situation. No decision of any consequence can ever be established
as a precedent unless it conforms to the official policy of the day. And, since
every important High Court decision is instantly brought to the attention of
judges at all levels, lower courts are quick to apply the doctrines enunciated
by the High Court. Inasmuch as no case has been found in which the High
Court refused to follow the policy directives of the Attorney General, that court
is readily seen to provide the principal means of transmitting policy decisions
from the government to the judiciary.
20. G.V.G. § 55(1)1.
21. G.V.G. § 55(1)2(a):
22. In the USSR the extraordinary appeal, until the recent reform, has not been de-
pendent on observation of a time limit; hence, in contrast to DDR decisions, Soviet judg-
ments heretofore lacked the character of finality. For description of the USSR practice,
see GOVERNMENT, LAW AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN EASTERN EUROPE 539
& app. (Gsovski & Grzbowski ed., in press).
23. G.V.G. §8 55(1)3, 56.
24. C.C.P. §8 301(2a), (2b).
25. C.C.P. § 309(3).
26. C.C.P. § 308.
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The plenary assembly of the High Court exercises yet another, more far-
reaching, prerogative. Upon a motion by its president or the Attorney General
or the Minister of Justice, it may issue directives of a general nature in the
interest of unified application of the law.2 7 To date, twelve of these directives.
binding on all courts, have been published. Some of them are simply
authoritative interpretations of existing legislative enactments.28 Others have.
by implication, abrogated existing legislation. In this category belong directives
two and three of October 28 and 31, 1953, rendering inapplicable the penal
provisions of certain statutes designed to protect the People's property and
domestic German trade.2 9 The less severe strictures of pre-existing law were
thus partially re-established. Both of these directives came at a time when the
DDR government, impressed with the extent of popular disaffection shown in
the June 1953 uprising, was eager to make a popular gesture.3"
Whether amending previous legislation issued via normal enactment, or
establishing new law, 31 or implementing existing statutes, the High Court exer-
cises delegated legislative power by setting general rules for an indeterminate
number of cases. Both the issuance and revocation 32 of norms is performed in
27. G.V.G. § 58.
28. Here, for example, belongs Directive No. 9 concerning paragraph 8 of the divorce
decree of 1955, issued July 1, 1957, reprinted in 11 N.J. 441 (1957), which sets out the
preferred interpretation of a loosely worded provision, the indeterminate concepts of
which allowed for a great degree of discretion in applying the decree to concrete situations.
29. Reprinted in the official edition of the penal code, STRAFGESETzBtCH DER DE TSCHEN
DEmOKRATISCHEx REPUBLIK 200 (1956).
30. More recently, Directive No. 7 of Nov. 20, 1956, [1956] G.B.D.D.R. 425, has
changed article 11 of the decree on dismissal protection of June 7, 1951, [1951] G.B.D.D.R.
550, by introducing a new prerequisite for validity of employment dismissals: simultaneity
of trade union confirmation of dismissal and written dismissal notice from the employer.
See, Langner, Haben die Richtlinien des Obersten Gerichts rueckwirkende Kraft?, 11 N.J.
624 (1957).
31. However, a number of directives pertain to new fields, where incipient, and at times
conflicting, practices existed without benefit of a recognizable body of statutory law. This
may have been due either to the novelty of the field (for example, Directive No. 6 setting
out definite rules for the use and evaluation of blood typing in paternity cases, reprinted
in 9 N.J. 447 (June 29, 1955)), or to the legislators' neglect to deal with more detailed
problems, an especially prevalent failing in procedural fields. See, e.g., Directive No. 10
of July 1, 1957, setting out procedures in implementation of the decree handling divorce
proceedings of Feb. 7, 1956, [1956] G.B.D.D.R. 145, reprinted in 11 N.J. 445 (1957), and
the most recent Directive No. 12 issued April 28, 1958, 12 N.J. 317 (1958), giving detailud
instructions on the proceedings to be followed in the application of C.C.P. § 268. This
provision concerns the pursuit of damage claims against a defendant by way of supplemen-
tary proceedings before the same court in which the criminal case is pending.
32. Directive No. 1 was revoked by a curt announcement from the High Court on
April 30, 1956, 10 N.J. 263 (1956). The directive of April 29, 1953 concerned the pre-
requisites for remittance of sentences according to C.C.P. § 346. Defending the High
Court against criticism in regard to this removal procedure, the vice president of the
court pointed out that this way of proceeding had been necessitated by the need to
release prisoners beyond the frame of the normal application of § 346 in the "interest of
the relaxation of the international situation." Ziegler, Zur Kritik am Obersthn Gerlcht,
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close liaison with, and at times at the immediate demand of, the executive organs.
The unwillingness of Communist doctrine to recognize the norm-creating
capacity of the High Court, and that doctrine's insistence on the court's purely
interpretive function,33 find some justification both in the Marxist theory of
norm-creation and in the High Court's place in the de facto chain of command. If
the court, in a technical sense, creates norms, it does so only on sufferance.
RECRUITING AND TENURE OF THE JUDICIARY
This hierarchy of courts operates with a corps of judicial officers which has
been almost completely changed since 1945. 3 4 Virtually all judges and prose-
cutors in office at the end of the Second World War were displaced at an early
date by new personnel. The barring of Nazis and related categories from office
accounted for eighty per cent of the incumbents. Of those who remained, many
were presumed to have steered clear of the Nazi party mainly because of its
plebeian complexion. This group did not entirely satisfy the new rulers. Fur-
thermore, the Communists sought a radical change in social structure and
property relations; to have inexperienced personnel handle the administration
of justice in this situation was not as risky and costly as it might have been if
superficial political change alone had been intended.
The new dispensers of justice-called "People's judges" and "People's at-
torneys"-first took office in the summer of 1945. At first, mandatory qualifica-
tions were simply graduation from primary school and recommendation by the
local political group enjoying the confidence of the occupation authorities. Some-
what later, the completion of a four-to-six-month training course became a
further requirement. By April 1953, ninety-one per cent of all judges and over
ninety-eight per cent of all prosecutors were of the new, People's variety. Eighty-
five per cent of the judges and ninety-eight per cent of the prosecutors were
members of the Communists' Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED).
The old legal profession was out except for some Weimar survivors and Nazi
persecutees devoted to the SED, and a handful of undaunted and adaptable
careerists. Eventually, the term of the lawyers' cram courses was extended to
10 N.J. 715, 716 (1956). Directives 2 and 3 have been superseded by §§ 30-31 of the
Penal Law Amendment Act of Dec. 11, 1957, [1957] G.B.D.D.R. 646.
33. See, e.g., DEuTscHEs INSTITUT FuER REcHTsWiSENSCHAFT, LEHnBuCH DES
STRAFRECHTS DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOmRATISCHEN REPUBLIK-ALLGEMEINER TElL 242
(1957). Section 9 of the new statute of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union of Feb. 12,
1957, indicates a differentiation between directive rulings on general questions raised by the
application of legislation, constituting a legitimate function of the Supreme Court, and sug-
gestions for legislative interpretations or changes to be forwarded by the plenary session
of the court to legislative authorities. The difference, however, seems to rest more on an
attempt to safeguard the prevailing Eastern theory of the sources of legal rules than on
discernible differences in fact situations; for a discussion see Gsovski, Reform of the Sit-
prente Court of the Soviet Union, 5 HIGHLIGHTS OF CURRENT LEGISLATION AND ACTIVITIES
IN MID-EUROPE 507 (1957).
34. For the initiation of the new judiciary, with local variations as remembered by
participants, see Aus der Ersten Zeit Unserer Justiz, 9 N.J. 267 (1955).
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approximate traditional university training in duration. The curriculum centered
around political indoctrination. "On-the-job training" was conducted in courts
and prosecutors' offices which, in turn, underwent far-reaching structural change.
Zeal in pursuing the Government's objectives ranked much higher than famili-
arity with obsolete legal doctrine or technical skill in settling legal claims. The
old law itself withered, although in most fields it was not formally abrogated.-""
By 1960, all members of the judiciary who do not have an academic back-
ground must pass a qualifying examination; they will be assisted by three-to-five-
year correspondence courses with the Walter Ulbricht German Academy for
Political and Legal Sciences, the fountainhead of official wisdom.a 6 In 1955, the
first crop of the Academy's full-fledged graduates took their places next to the
original "People's judges" and "People's prosecutors." After a high-school
education at the hands of "worker and peasant faculties," these students had
been educated at the Academy during a two-year full-time program. Judicial
qualifications are also provided by completely revamped university law schools
in a four-year curriculum. The majority of aspirants for a judicial or state
attorney career are still being routed toward the universities. Recruits for the
more important administrative jobs pursue their studies at the Ulbricht
Academy.
Hitherto, the Ministry of Justice has appointed lower-court judges for three-
year terms, while the judges of the High Court have been elected for five-year
terms by the People's Assembly. According to recent SED decisions, this system
of election by assembly will, in the future, be extended to the lower courts, whose
members will be elected by the district assemblies and. in the more distant future,
by the people. This extension will not bring any material changes in actual
selection practices. The Ministry of Justice will still exercise control, although
the middle ranks of the SED hierarchy might be more closely and continually
associated with the selection of the judicial "cadres."
Any judge may be removed by the appointing agency on account of a criminal
record, for "violation of the constitution and other laws" and-an elastic concept
-- "for manifest violation of [his] duty as [judge]." a  Removal grounded on
inefficiency or unreliability arising from policy disputes, possibly engineered by
the party cell 38 of the court itself, is a regular if not frequent occurrence.3U
Uncertain tenure, use of the extraordinary appeal, and the fact that, as a last
resort, a rubber-stamp legislature can dexterously remove the long-range conse-
quences of an unsatisfactory judgment, serve to diminish the import of the
35. For a survey of developments in the field of DDR judicial administration by its
principal architects, see Benjamin & Melsheimer, Zehn Jahre demokratiscle Justiz in
Deutschland, 9 N.J. 259 (1955).
36. From the ranks of justice prosecution, people's police, and other administrative
offices, 474 members of correspondence courses passed their state examinations in the spring
of 1958. 12 N.J. 407 (1958).
37. G.V.G. §§ 16(1)a-b.
38. See paragraph preceding note 44 infra.
39. Recent cases of removal have been reported in 12 N.J. 369, 623 (1958). Disciplinary
transfers may be considered common practice.
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judicial function. Unshakable validity over a substantial span of time is what
lifts the legal judgment out of the stream of administrative orders changing
rapidly under the impact of new impulses or an appraisal of political conditions.
Such validity is not a characteristic of a judgment arrived at under the East
German system. But, one might argue, an East German judge, following the
provisions of the DDR Constitution,40 is still free to decide individual cases
according to pre-established rules and on the basis of evidence submitted to his
court. His decisions may not be upset unless certain fixed procedures are ob-
served. Thus he is unlike other officials, who may see their decisions uncere-
moniously discarded or ignored by their respective hierarchical superiors. This
line of argument cannot be accepted.
The Inforvwl Structure of Authority
The legal system of the DDR knows a number of informal devices which exert
enormous influence on the final effect of a judicial decision. In East Germany's
legal universe, private commentaries are as rare as privately sponsored law
journals. A monopoly of legal interpretation rests with the official legal authori-
ties. If a judge finds himself in need of elucidation on a point of law which
the reports or the official textbook do not provide, he may turn to the equally
official law journal. But this law journal is as much an educational as an inter-
pretative enterprise. Although controversy may be artificially stirred up for
didactic purposes, the journal is primarily concerned -with the "correct" indoctri-
nation of court and prosecution personnel and carries only such articles and
reports on judicial decisions as fit the purpose. Real controversy does arise
if the most recent party directives and resolutions are susceptible of a variety of
interpretations. But, once the authoritative gloss on the interpretation is pro-
vided, and possibly calculated ambiguities are clarified, everybody falls in line.
The absence of private commentaries is not accidental. 41 Nor is it due to a
"phonograph" theory of law of the kind that inspired the great legal enactments
40. Art. 127 of the constitution, reiterated in G.V.G. § 5, reads as follows: "the judges
are independent in their judicial function and only subject to the constitution and the
laws." However, the provision should be read in the context of G.V.G. § 11 (1), which not
only ties the judicial office holder to the observation of the constitution but demands from
him that he "unreservedly stand for the goals of the DDR." The job of the East German
"functionary of justice," as he is officially and correctly called, has recently been described
"as organizer of masses in the societal process of law formation and realization" rather
than "as arbiter between contending parties." Strohbach, Sorgfaeltiges Studium der
Partcibeschhessa verhindert Dogmatismus und Fornmalismus, 12 N.J. 689, 693 (1953).
41. A few years ago the official law journal permitted a judge to ask why the DDR
published no law commentaries by outstanding jurists. Volkland, Ueber das Verhaeltnis
.wzschen Rechtzeissenschaft und Justizpraxis, 8 N.J. 221, 229 (1954). The answer was
supplied by the highest-ranking official of the Ministry of Justice; recommending to the
readers an edition of legislative texts, he disposed of the subject by saying that "brief"
commentaries were notoriously "insufficient and worthless." Toeplitz, Zun Erschebten der
neuen Textausgaben, 8 N.J. 292, 293 (1954). The circumlocution made it abundantly
clear that the very subject of comprehensive commentaries was tabu; the same phenomenon
in Soviet Russia is described in DAVID & HAZARD, 1 Lu DROIT SoviETIUE: 220 (1954).
1959J
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the era of enlightenment, such as Prussia's Allgemeines Landrecht or the
codes of the French Revolution. DDR doctrine certainly does not regard law
as a closed system wherein the judge has nothing to do but draw logical con-
clusions from rigidly fixed premises. The ban on private interpretation is de-
liberate and political; it serves to prevent the emergence of a rival center of legal
doctrine which uncontrollable minds could use to disseminate independent
opinion. Nothing could come of such independence of juridical thought but the
obstruction of the Government's effort to train the judge to make unquestioning
application of the frequently changing norm to the case on the docket.
Yet not even the DDR, despite its stress on the judge's continuing "educa-
tion," despite exhortations and cajolery, can force him to absorb all of the official
wisdom it is so eager to purvey. So, where the call to study fails, more accentu-
ated pressure appears. Under any legal system, cases arise that, when scruti-
nized by higher courts, reveal delays below and insufficient attention to one or
more phases in the proceedings; nevertheless, appellate courts often are unwill-
ing to conclude that these factors constitute reversible error. While upholding
a decision, a higher court may mention such shortcomings in passing. As the
judgment on appeal-especially under the East German system, which only
knows per curiam opinions-will, of necessity, concentrate on the reasons for
upholding the lower court's decision, it will touch only slightly on more prob-
lematic points. Consequently, the lower-court ordinarily need not be unduly
exercised over the appellate opinion, even though it may be critical in part.
The institutionalization of judicial criticism, as introduced in paragraph four of
the East German Code of Criminal Procedure, is designed to fill this gap. When-
ever a case comes up on appeal, perhaps to as low a tribunal as a district court,
the appellate bench may take action even when no sufficient ground to modify
or set aside the judgment of the lower court exists. For example, in the event
of delays in arraigning prisoners, undue adjournments or procedural mistakes
of one kind or another, the appellate court may expose shortcomings at the lower
level by publishing a piece of educational criticism. This criticism does not affect
the validity of the judgment. But, reprinted in the official law journal, it is
supposed to induce the court in question and other courts facing similar probleni,
to discontinue the condemned practices. It is also within the authority of t ,
higher courts to keep score on lower-level colleagues in a kind of indez file!
which records typical mistakes-both political and legal-and serves as a vad -
mecum for self-improvement.
42
Both institutionalized criticism and an occasional index file of typical mistakes
focus only upon the segment of cases which come to the higher court's knowl-
edge by way of ordinary or extraordinary appeals or protests. In actual practice,
only a fraction of lower-court cases attract the attention of the courts above.
Review of the lower-court proceedings at the request of the prosecutor general
42. See the proclamation of the Leipzig Administration of Justice, reprinted in 7 N.J.
725 (1953); Grass, Trautzsch & Stiller, Die Selbskeerpflichhtngen des Becirksgerichts
Leipzig sun Jahr der grossen Initiative, 7 N.J. 759 (1953).
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or by order of the High Court president takes place, as a rule, only when this
or that segment of the SED especially interested in upsetting a specific judg-
ment exerts sufficient pressure.
43
Seen from the authorities' viewpoint, these institutionalized checks-appeals,
extraordinary appeals, judicial criticism, helped along by some measure of law
periodical comments-have one essential shortcoming. They leave open to what
extent and with what dispatch the lower courts will be able to produce decisions
in conformity with announced official policies. Consequently, a network of politi-
cal and moral pressures influencing and determining the attitudes of the judiciary
has been built up to complement both the educational processes and the institu-
tionalized checks on the judges' individual decisions. The call to self-improve-
ment is the central theme of these additional controls.
Self-improvement does not come automatically. A double-pronged machinery
sets it in motion: on the upper level, the Ministry of Justice and, for the prose-
cutors, the Attorney General's office; on the lower level, the individual court's
party unit. This unit comprises all party members from the presiding judge to
the charwoman. Often, the court's administrative officers, who make the assign-
ments and supervise the docket, enjoy a higher party rank and corresponding
influence on the cell's resolutions than does the judicial personnel. It is before
this body that the judge, as any other party worker, undergoes the ritual of
"self-commitment." The "self-commitment" pledge specifies areas of mandatory
improvement, either along the lines of previous criticism by superiors or party
officials, or else simply in dutiful observance of recent policy pronouncements.
In addition, each court holds frequent judicial conferences. Every judge is
expected to submit a progress report; the individual members' weak spots are
discussed, and the more advanced ones straighten out those who fail. When
necessary, the party "plant unit" deals with obstinately repeated "mistakes."
How effective is self-improvement guidance by higher courts and party pres-
sure? Much though it may upset the Government, the answer always depends on
the individual judge's zeal and application-another uncertain factor. Strong
emphasis is therefore placed on continuing supervision by "instructors" who
are expected to give the everyday activity of the judiciary a steadier direction
than could emanate from the higher courts. In the person of the instructor, the
jo b of functional and political supervision merge; he studies, compares, evalu-
ates and criticizes the judge's performance from both professional and political
viewpoints. Instructors operating out of the Ministry of Justice and the Office
of the Attorney General reach down to the level of district courts and district
prosecutors; in turn, instructors at the district level are assigned to the local
cuurts. In addition, a whole brigade of inspectors, namely all the district in-
structors, some district court judges, and personnel officers accompanied by
the executive officer of the local court under review, administer an annual
43. In a reply to critics, such operational breaks were cited by High Court Deputy
President Walter Ziegler as a chief reason for the highest tribunal's shortcomings in the
implementation of governmental policy. Ziegler, supra note 32, at 717.
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evaluation of each court's performance. 4 4 The court's executive officer is then
of particular value, both on account of his familiarity with the judges' records,
as well as for his standing in the party organization, which casts him in the
role of the court's permanent political supervisor.
45
One story tells of an over-eager chief instructor who, feeling misgivings
about a specific decision, went out to interview local people. When he bad
assembled the facts, he discovered that the court indeed had been at fault and
the reasons for the error.46 Was this his real mission? Not according to pre-
vailing opinion in the mid-1950's. Most comments have expressed the view that
it is not the instructor's function to retry individual cases. The emphasis is on im-
proving the quality of the court's work rather than on securing justice in particu-
lar instances. Cultural and political problems are to be investigated. Judges are
to be counselled as to the political and social imperatives and why judgments
based on proper fact finding and sound legal reasoning may be utterly wrong
when the social and political implications of both the incriminating act and the
judicial decision are left unheeded. Within this framework, judicial opinions
are thoroughly studied. The performance of the individual judge and the po-
litical effect of his overall judicial record are evaluated by instructors and
discussed with him. Beyond this, the annual inspection is to ascertain the
extent to which each court's collective effort contributed to the fulfillment of the
judiciary's political and ideological obligations. As the political situation
changes, however, so may that of the inspection brigade. The greater the
pressure on functionaries of the judicial apparatus for active political participa-
tion, the more pronounced is the inspectors' tendency to reinvestigate cases, to
expose their class contents and the roles of the parties and the judge's "formal-
istic" neglect of these factors.
47
Among the various techniques devised to make the judge concentrate on doing
a political job for the Government, the combination of everyday supervision and
counselling by instructors and annual roundups stands out. This combination
is pervasive and has become symbolic of the courts' role and position. Whether
a judge is good or bad is measured on a scale which registers his ability to grasp
and assimilate, at any given moment and without delay, the government view
44. Inspection reports are frequently discussed and suggestions for improvement offered
in print. See Boehme & Krueger, Die Arbeit der Instrukteurbrigaden bei Revisionen
verbessern, 10 N.J. 11 (1956) ; Ostmann, Ueber die ustiz-verwaltung, 8 N.J. 37 (1954) ;
Streit, Aus den Erfahrungen einer Brigade mi Bezirk Potsdam, 12 N.J. 620 (1958);
Windisch, Die Veraenderung der Instrukteurtaetigkeit in der Staatsanwaltschaft, 12 N.J.
839 (1958).
45. Separate inspection teams within one jurisdiction, assigned to the court, the
prosecutor's office, and the police department, actually proceed with a degree of coordina-
tion-though not necessarily in complete agreement with one another-so as to bring into
the open interdepartmental friction and rivalry and obtain uniform corrective results.
Cf. Gerhardt, Ueber die Durchfuehrung von Revisionen, 10 N.J. 600 (1956).
46. Becker, Eine praktische Methode der Revision, 10 N.J. 359 (1956).
47. See the recital of the experiences of the inspection brigade in the Potsdam district
in Streit, Aus den Erfahrungen einer Brigade im Bezirk Potsdam, 12 N.J. 620, 621 (1958).
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of the political and social situation. "First and foremost in the instructor's
work," as one of the architects of the system put it, "is immediate transmission
from the top to the bottom; . . . he is a helper and political advisor." 48
But however faithful and eager the transmitting agents may be, the Govern-
ment's political vista is bound to suffer in transmission. Even agents who knew
all the answers and could correct all conceivable mistakes would not be able
to eliminate or prevent error, deviation, and lack of intuitive political adapta-
bility. The true test of their achievement is in the frequency and intensity of
the judges' voluntary, spontaneous identification with the DDR's political
leadership. Ideally, the judicial act would be transformed into an abstraction
unrelated to social reality. All societal differentiations would become sub-
merged in universal identity, wherein the mind of the judge unconsciously but
unremittingly communicates with the all-pervasive mind of the Government-
totalitarian reality taking the form of ultrademocratic chimera.
THE JUDGE AND THE OTHER ORGANS OF THE STATE
It is doubtful whether in German trial practice an equilibrium ever existed
between the defense lawyer and the prosecution. Somehow, in spite of his theo-
retical status as officer of the court, private counsel could never quite compete
with the prestige of the prosecutor, representative of the most "objective office"
of the world, as it was known in official parlance. But, whatever the previously
existing element of imbalance, it has increased many times over in the practice
of the DDR. The lawyer has lost in status as a professional man and conse-
quently in usefulness to his client. This is as much due to the fact that the
DDR is too busy reforming the life habits of its members to care much about
equipping them with efficient means to defend their claims as to special measures
aimed at narrowing the prerogatives of the profession. The Code of Criminal
Procedure is not overly concerned with the lawyer's prerogative. But it is the
disregard for the Code by prosecutor and judge and 4 9 -as important-the re-
evaluation of the respective position of defense and state authority, to which
the system constantly draws the lawyer's attention, that has limited his field
of activity. Moreover, since 1953 the lawyer has increasingly been unable to
exist as an independent professional entity conducting his business either alone
or in free association. New lawyers can be admitted to practice only as mem-
bers of the official lawyers' cooperative. Disabilities for nonmembers and privi-
leges for the joiner make continued independent practicing a hazardous affair ;50
48. Benjamin, Der Instructeur-Helfer und politischer Berater, 8 N.J. 285, 290 (1954).
For more recent discussion see Bildermann, Einige Hinweise fuer die Revision der Kreisge-
richte, 11 N.J. 272 (1957).
49. During the short-lived thaw of 1956, the President of the Berlin Lawyers' Coopera-
tive drew up a kind of list of grievances. See the report on the meeting of the chairmen
of lawyers' cooperatives, Fragen des Strafrerfahrens voin Standpunkt des Verteidigers, 10
N.J. 434 (1956).
50. The decree on the formation of lawyers' cooperatives dates from May 15, 1953.
[1953] 1 G.B.D.D.R. 725. The "model statute" attached to the decree has been consider-
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the net effect is to undermine the fundamental relationship of trust between
lawyer and client. In turn, the cooperative's administration-which assigns
cases and clients-has recently been the object of special attention and "ideo-
logical schooling" on the part of the Ministry of Justice. 51 Whether the depro-
fessionalizing influence of this new bureaucratic fetter is balanced by the
radical elimination of the lawyer's predominantly pecuniary motivation, on
which official criticism of the capitalist lawyer lays such stress, is an interesting
if debatable point.52 At any rate, as the prestige of the profession is incom-
mensurably lower than that for other law jobs, and as the style and condition
of the new society allow for only limited use of the lawyers' intellectual equip-
ment, its members scarcely do now, nor can they in the future, form any
counterweight against the prosecutor in his present role.
Inasmuch as the Attorney General's and Minister of Justice's activities are
coordinated by the incumbents' common zeal to transform into administrative
practice the impulses and orders received from the highest party authorities
and formalized by the Council of Ministers, the independent position of the
Attorney General's office may be of more symbolic than actual importance in
the DDR scheme of things. Nevertheless, its enhanced status has some impact
on the style and method of DDR policy. Through its determination of the
competent criminal court and its power over extraordinary appeals, the Attor-
ney General's office plays a primordial role in blocking out penal policy.
The political importance of the case rather than the fine art of legal classi-
fication determines the conduct of the prosecution. Political guidance may take
a variety of forms. The first job of the prosecution is to spot the possible
political implication of a given situation. The more tightly the Government
controls opinion-molding, the more visibly will political coloring tinge every
seemingly private situation. Divorce, libel, assault, the mistreatment of animals
-all might acquire a political meaning.53 Slight stirrings of misgivings, doubts.
ably changed through the introduction of tight official supervision of the cooperatives'
activities by Decree of March 22, 1958, [1958] G.B.D.D.R. 311.
51. A list of grievances against the lawyers' cooperatives' lack of social consciousness
together with recital of officially applied remedies has recently been furnished by the
ministry's specialist in charge of lawyers' affairs. Helm, Fragen dcr EntzackIlung ciner
soaialistischen Rechtsanwaltschaft, 12 N.J. 298 (1958). Mixed control brigades with the par-
ticipation of the Ministry of Justice, the SED and the Association of Democratic Jurists
are now recommended for supplementing the feeble activities of the lawyers' cooperatives'
own control commissions and as a means of bringing the cooperatives up to required
standards. See the official report reprinted in 12 N.J. 665 (1958).
52. Lawyers' cooperatives still try to keep membership down in order to maximize
members' incomes, see Helm, supra note 51, at 300, but this may be part and parcel of the
"unsatisfactory political and ideological condition" of the cooperative.
53. The interaction between public opinion, the various echelons of the party bureau-
cracy and the corresponding legal authorities is illustrated in the curious story of an all-too-
conscientious SED factory guard. He was tripped up by the irate staff of his plant when
he was caught maltreating and cruelly killing a vagrant dog which somehow had gotten
on the plant property. Ejected under public pressure from both his job and the party, he
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passive resistance or more active insubordination may pass through devious
channels before they appear in the trial setting as private quarrels or trifling
brushes with the lower fringes of authority. The very frequence of such cases
betrays crammed living in a climate where complaining and personal grudges
take the place of self-expression and personal endeavor. In the eyes of the
rulers, even the least significant and most ludicrous or banal run-in necessarily
assumes a more sinister complexion. In every aimless individual reaction, the
exponents of governmental power are bound to look for traces of a repetitive,
rebellious design.
Such are the situations with which judge and prosecutor, without special
signals from higher authorities, must deal, day in, day out, in the required
political manner. They are on their own, at least at the trial stage; in a way,
the individual setting is unpatterned in the development of the plot attentively
watched by participants and bystanders. Without genuine newspaper coverage,
repercussions of scenes on the judicial stage are weak. The most limited effect
remains hidden from the actors for the identical reason. It is the educational
job of the office of the Attorney General to train even the lowest local staff
member to recognize incipient political situations and their implications on
his own.
If a case has been referred to the Attorney General's office by political author-
ity, if it has the making of a cause ctlabre or at least suggests that it could be
widely used for propaganda purposes, the prosecutor may be under orders to
tell the court unequivocally how he would like the case to be handled with
regard both to penalty and applicable law. Thus, the expected roles are reversed.
In theory, under the DDR code no less than under most continental codes, it
is, up to the court to choose the legal formula to be applied in a given criminal
situation. Deprived of this interpretive function, the court is hamstrung in its
punitive role as well. With respect to the punishment to be imposed, the court,
under a widely accepted doctrine, may disregard the authority of the Govern-
was also sentenced by the local court to one year in prison and a fine. When the defendant
managed to get the ear of the higher authorities, the story took a different complexion.
The personnel chief of the plant was removed from both the plant and the party roster
and the local party secretary was severely taken to task for having lost the ability to recog-
nize the enemies of the working class. A week before the discussion of the incident at the
SED's fourth party congress, the High Court-on an extraordinary appeal by the Attorney
General---quashed lower court proceedings and acquitted the defendant as having acted
within the purview of his duties. The judgment sharply castigated the local prosecutor
aid both the local and the district court judges, who on appeal had only rescinded the
prison sentence without otherwise modifying the conviction, for having allowed themselves
to become bamboozled by the class enemy. High Court Judgment of March 29, 1954, 8 N.J.
242 (1954); NTIRANDLUNGEN DES 4. PARTEITAGS DEl1 SOZIALIsTIscHEN EINHEITSPART]EI
DhLITsCHLAMbs 30. MARZ Bis 6. APRIL 1954, at 180 (1954) (Ulbricht) ; id. at 559-60 (discus-
,ion speaker Kiefer). The story of the "dog of Muehlhausen" has entered the legal hagiogra-
phy of Eastern Germany as the fourth party congress's legacy to the legal fraternity, the living
example of the dialectical unity of legality and "Parteilichkeit." See Benjamin, Vorn IV.
-zun r'. Parteitag der sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 12 N.J. 437 (1958).
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ment, as represented by the prosecutor, only if it holds a basically divergent
view.54
Of course, the burden of the judge in a case tried under Klieg-light conditions
might be eased by his administrative superiors. The official intervention of
the prosecution's representative might go hand in hand with direct-though
behind the stage-intervention from the higher echelons of the Ministry of
Justice. In these instances, ranking officials of the Ministry would confer with
the judge about the disposition of the case. This, however, is mostly limited
to exceptional situations justifying spectacular legal or propaganda perform-
ances. Frequent repetition would expose too many fissures; show trials as
an everyday affair might generate indifference and cynicism instead of that
tremor which electrifies the faithful and makes the timid pledge active allegi-
ance. The requisite minute preparation of the show to be staged and the
public reaction to be evoked pays off only in cases of outstanding political
importance. But, while individualized high-level production design and stage
direction are infrequent, the political approach to justice is never absent.
It is for this reason that the prosecutor, who embodies the permanent state
interest and who, at least in theory, is fully cognizant of the actual needs of
the political powers 5 at each and any moment, has a far stronger impact at
the trial stage than that of a mere counterbalance against the defense, as he
was conceived in old-style continental doctrine (now deemed rather unrealistic
-not without obvious justification-by East German penal practitioners).
True, at the pretrial stage, a preventive detention warrant must be signed by
a judge. But here the judge's power ends; at least on paper, the prosecutor is
in charge of everything else.56
In everyday practice, the stature of the prosecutor's office, tremendously
enhanced vis-A-vis defense and court alike, does not appear quite so big. The
criminal procedure code's "investigative organs," the criminal police and the
ubiquitous security services, tend to relegate the prosecutor to the role of
manager or writ-signer. This much was officially admitted during the brief
54. Attorney General Melsheimer, Sozialistische Gesetzlichkeit int Strafverfahren, 10
N.J. 289, 295 (1956).
55. The gap between theory and practice, however, is considerable, and the "revision
reports" are full of complaints about wrong political estimates and lack of political-
ideological clarity and of unified political line in the district and county prosecutors' offices.
For a recent criticism on the basis of experience in the Magdeburg district, see Spranger
& Wunsch, Ueberwindung von ilaengeht in; der Arbeit der Justizorgane lond der Staats-
anwaltschaft in Be--irk Magdeburg, 12 N.J. 267 (1958).
56. Judicial pretrial investigation has been abolished, leaving pretrial proceedings con-
centrated in the hands of the prosecution or the "investigative organs." If necessary,
the prosecutor orders search and seizure. See C.C.P. § 116. The "investigative organs"
may do likewise, with the judge relegated to confirmation within forty-eight hours. See
C.C.P. § 140. During the trial, the prosecutor may put direct questions to the defendant,
while the latter's lawyer may question only through the presiding officer of the court.
C.C.P. § 201(2)-(3). The prosecutor sets conditions on lawyers' visits with defendants
during pretrial investigation. See C.C.P. § 80.3.
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political thaw of 1956 when the prosecuting staff's position as second fiddle
to the security police was deplored and remedial action suggested.
Notwithstanding the extended role of the police, the prosecution's power
remains spectacular, especially since the DDR, following the Soviet example,
has made the prosecutor's office the kingpin of what might be called an attempt
to establish an intrabureaucratic balance. Because the Communist regime's
parliamentary bodies lack popular backing and because the interests of their
members too closely intertwine with those of the executive to allow them to play
the role of their brethren's keepers, those bodies cannot fulfill the job of watch-
dog and critic of the administration. Thus, in order to avoid entrusting control
completely to hierarchical superiors, departmental duties must be parcelled out
in such a way as to make one department supervise and criticize the activity
of another. The premise is that, within one departmental branch, the higher
echelons are too much involved in the quality and detail of that department's
performance to be honestly and impartially critical. Consequently, criticism
should be the function of an outside agency. This sums up at least part of the
reasoning which made the DDR follow the Russian model in assigning to the
prosecutor's office the task of watching over the legality of administrative
performance across the entire range of governmental services.5
7
The flaw in this kind of reasoning is obvious. No matter how painstakingly
the prosecutor's men may wade through collections of laws and ordinances,
make their inspection trips and investigate individual citizens' complaints, they
will always be on the outside. 5 Unfamiliar with the day-by-day techniques
and shortcuts of the agencies under review, the best they can do is detect
manifest violations of the law. The prosecutor's office then may enter a protest
and, if it carries enough weight at the moment, compel change. But the change
57. S.A.S. §§ 10-15.
58. In 1957 the purely bureaucratic character of the prosecutor's function as general
watchdog of legality was established by the then Deputy Attorney General. I-aid, Einige
Aktuelle Problese der Staatsanwaltschaftlichen Arbeit, 11 N.J. 796 (1957). His job was
defined as one of following up complaint signals, but not as undertaking investigations
on his own. But meanwhile this ranking official had been found "to have knuckled under to
the attacks of the imperialists and (in conjunction with the Wollweber group) to have
taken a revisionist position." Neues Deutschland, June 13, 1958, p. 4. See also Bohm,
Verbesserung der Arbeit der obersten Staatsanwaltschaft, 12 N.J. 629, 630 (1958). By
summer 1958, we therefore find the members of district attorneys' offices developing the
"new style of work" prescribed by the fifth SED party congress.. It may-even go so far
as to include putting in a two-week stint with agricultural cooperatives (present day
"points of concentration," see note 97 infra), in order to be always at hand when advice and
support is needed. But in spite of this "feverish activism it seems doubtful whether control
includes systematic, around-the-clock and self-initiated inspection of legality. Even the intro-
ductory text accompanying the Attorney General's new directives of July 23, 1958, starts
with the admission that the prosecutor has a hard enough time to take care of his in-box.
Attorney General Melsheimer, therefore, sticks to the ritual of recommending close co-
operation with other power holders and of prescribing the special initiatives needed for
taking care of present "points of concentration." Melsheimer, Die Alufgaben der Staatsan-
waltschaft nach dem V. Parteitag, 12 N.J. 511 (1958).
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will not eradicate the evil rooted in a chain of command over which the prose-
cutor's office has no jurisdiction.
In the mutual supervision schemes conceived to maintain intrabureaucratic
equilibrium, local and district courts are on both the giving and receiving ends.
The institution of judicial criticism enables them, if pertinent facts should come
to their attention, to expose administrative activity inconsonant with the law.
So far, they have not made extensive use of this privilege-out of laziness,
some critics assert.5 9 The courts themselves are obligated to report regularly
to the local and district municipal bodies' committees on administrative and
police affairs. In addition, since 1957, an obligatory annual report is submitted
to the local deliberative assemblies, whose critical objections must be answered
within four weeks.
Such intrabureaucratic criticism is no substitute for public reaction, but under
certain circumstances it may provoke, channel or, more often, simulate genuine
public response. There is no way to predict whether local power positions will
suffer from being pitted against each other or whether they will merge into
consolidated power blocs, all local machines uniting to form a single mutual-
aid society. Preservation of the intrabureaucratic balance must never be taken
for granted, even though hierarchic dependencies, performance reports, and
deadlines are designed to ensure it in a mechanical way.
The Judge and the Community
In so far as the working of intrabureaucratic controls is at best a haphazard
affair, they must be supplemented by drawing the people at large into a role
which the official institutions perform unsatisfactorily: that of the friendly critic
who voluntarily and actively participates in the development of the country's
institutions. But the attainment of this goal depends upon whether the judge
succeeds in winning the trust of the population. Developing proficiency in
performing just such a feat has been one of the regime's permanent and urgent
concerns.
How is the judge to prove worthy of trust? As he no longer freely arbi-
trates when the individual clashes with the Government, what does his
superior knowledge of established norms or his keen insight into the hardships
and conflicts of daily living matter to the public? In fact, the judge can win
acclaim only if he has a chance to apply a good law or help enforce a govern-
ment program that makes sense to people. Apparently, Soviet jurists and their
colleagues within the Soviet orbit recognize this problem; when the party, in
the wake of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, denounced them for inhuman, bureaucratic and formalistic handling
of the law, they retaliated in kind and publicly urged that the people be given
good statutes, carefully drafted and easy to understand.
But then, what laws are "good" in the judgment of the people? Many norm.,
59. Streit, Einige Hinweise aur Auswertung der 3. Partekonferenw der SED, 10 N.J.
257, 258 (1956) ; Berg, Zur Anwendung der Gerichtskritik, 10 N.J. 307 (1956).
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the judges must observe exist in the area of purely technical regulations or
fields unrelated to the actual distribution of power; they do not represent con-
tentious issues to the average citizen. In other spheres-for example, violence
against persons-the system that most unobtrusively ensures peace and quiet
in interpersonal relations and prevents turbulent flare-ups will meet with the
widest approval.
In a more controversial area-divorce-neither legislation nor the judiciary
has been able to establish clear-cut normative standards. The search for guilt
has been eliminated by legislative fiat.60 The courts now oscillate between, on
the one hand, required societal standards--the welfare of the children and the
stability of interpersonal relations as a prerequisite of labor stability-and, on
the other, the objective degree of a couple's alienation. Yet, especially in lower
courts, something aldn to guilt enters, so to say, through a legitimate sidedoor.
Courts invoke the legislatively sanctioned consideration of "intolerable hard-
ship" for the respondent when refusing a divorce. While the perplexity of the
courts before this problem is evident, they should, in the public's mind, soft-
pedal the cynical emphasis on the State's interest evident in earlier decisions.
And the courts have learned that, at least in this context, state interest is ambigu-
ous and far from easy to determine in the individual case. The public undoubt-
edly will give them credit for a measure of honest and realistic striving to solve
the riddles of what, in spite of all exhortations to the parties concerned to
demonstrate higher forms of "socialist consciousness," remains an essentially
private relationship. 61
As for laws dealing with the protection of the economic order, popular
response is probably ambivalent. Offenses in this sphere may give oppressed
citizens the same feeling of satisfaction which they derive from any act flouting
the public order, especially a violation with political overtones. But tacit
emotional complicity may be replaced by hostility when the offense has caused
inconvenience or material damage to known groups of citizens. Perhaps judicial
sanctions will not then be questioned; they may even evoke applause. A psycho-
analyst, arguing from transference theory, might suggest that such behavior
would provide a vicarious outlet for aggressive feeling that otherwise would con-
verge upon the prevailing authorities.
In any event, the Government is always eager to use the judge's contacts
with the citizenry to gain greater resonance. The men of the judiciary are
saddled with heavy chores foreign to the judicial function as conceived by the
Western mind. Judges are called upon to take part in variegated election
(0. Marriage Decree of Nov. 24, 1955, [1955] G.B.D.D.R. 849, § 8.
61. The High Court Directives No. 9 and 10 of July 1, 1957, 11 N.J. 441-49 (1957),
the first discussing the substantive problem of divorce, the second the procedural aspects
of divorce and alimony, testify to the dilemma discussed above. Standards of "objective
alienation" seem to vary. They are more severe when children are still to be taken care
of than where only the mutual relations of the partners are concerned. At any rate, in the
latter case the by no means unambiguous terms of the directive strive towards limiting
the invocation of "intolerable hardship" as grounds for refusing a divorce.
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campaigns; sometimes this adds-in an ambiguous way-to their political
prestige. As part of the regular routine, they attend and address plant meet-
ings, conventions of farm cooperatives and other officially sponsored gather-
ings ;62 there, they may either vaingloriously orate on general subjects or,
talking about their workaday business, try to obtain a sympathetic hearing for
the courts' problems and difficulties.
Many a campaign to bring the judiciary and the population closer together
has been tested. For example, two have been launched, after careful prepara-
tion and a great deal of publicity, to mobilize public interest and cooperation
in the election of lay judges.6 3 Considerable effort has been exerted to make the
individual citizen pay attention to and assume responsibility for the work of the
courts. Special courses are set up to train lay assessors; those elected are
organized in "collectives" and required to report to the plants and offices from
which they were elected. In some places lay assessors attend, over and above
their trial duties, court sessions focused on criticism of past judicial perform-
ance.
Shunned by the average citizen, the lay assessor's part-time office at first
attracted the wrong people. Many elected assessors had to be eliminated as
unfit. By stressing the educational aspects of judicial work, the Government
expects to obtain more willing participation on a wider range. The expectation
may not be altogether baseless, since people in the DDR can hardly escape
"honorific" public duties of one kind of another, and service as a lay judge
may be tempting as a politically uncolored and uncompromising chore. As the
employer of some 40,000 lay assessors, the Government perhaps should not tell
a reluctant candidate: "You don't hold any office yet, Heinrich, why don't you
tackle the lay assessor's job on the local court? You won't have anything to
do there but nod your head once in a while so you won't fall asleep."614 But
the formula works with some success.
The duty of protecting adherents and functionaries of the regime against
outbreaks of popular hostility keeps the judge from entering very far into the
people's confidence. To an average citizen, the declared enemy of the regime,
62. In quantitative terms the turnout looks impressive. In 1957 courts conducted
11,280 popular meetings on administration of justice problems. These meetings were at-
tended by 530,000 visitors. But the prosecutors did even better. Their 15,130 meetings drew
830,000 visitors. To these figures 11,000 "judicial accounts" before popular meetings and
14,000 meetings preparing the election of lay assessors must be added. These statistics are
given by Benjamin, Die dialeklische Einhelt von Gesetklichkeit und Parteilichkcit durch-
setcen!, 12 N.J. 365 -(1958). - .. . . .
63. Trial by jury was virtually abolished in Germany as early as 1923. Instead lay
assessors, selected from panels drawn by municipal bodies, were made voting tribunal
members. After the collapse of Nazi rule, this Weimar setup was fully restored in East
and West. The main innovation subsequently introduced in the DDR was election of lay
assessors at places of employment, i.e., industrial plants, offices, collective farms, etc.
64. This suggestion is drawn from comments by a law assessor in Die gegcnwiirtiget
Aufgaben der Scl6ffen. Zetrale Schffemkonferenz am 3. wid 4. November 1956, at 43
(published by the DDR Ministry of Justice, Berlin, 1956).
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the spy, or the deviator within high party ranks remains a figure from another
world. But the local hero of labor, the rural party potentate or the meticulous
police officer are familiar to everybody. During a drunken brawl, many a
pent-up hatred may take the form of an insult or, if inebriety progresses further,
an assault against these worthies. With an assist from local witnesses, the
county court judge, given a chance, might try to reduce such rather frequent
occurrences to their lowest legal denominator.6 5 But the party functionary,
the higher court judges, the instructor from the Ministry of Justice will be
on the watch to ensure that these insults and affrays are not downgraded to
harmless disturbances of the public order, and are correctly treated and pun-
ished as major threats against the security of the country.6 6 The judge's
friendly contact with the community must never advance to the point where
he loses his complete identification with the powers that be.
The same need to protect loyal adherents of the regime lies at the bottom
of the new-fangled concept, "socially justified criticism." What is at stake
under this rubric is not so much the judge's popularity with the community
at large as the law court's duty to protect third-party interests. "Socially
justified criticism" accords judicial protection to the criticism of individuals by
other individuals, a process popularly called "denunciation" and rooted in the
spontaneity of petty interest, envy, rivalry and personal animosity. Carry a
tale about X to the personnel director of the plant or make a derogatory com-
ment about Y in every neighbor's hearing in the village square, and the DDR
High Court will commend you for "socially justified criticism" so long as X's
or Y's actions or their possible consequences may be construed as harmful to
society. This atmosphere permits a woman party member in good standing
who holds a grudge against a female neighbor to go to the personnel office
of the plant where she works and mention male visitors entering or leaving the
neighbor's apartment (even when the neighbor was not at home). Her "criti-
cism" will be "socially justified" provided she does not forget at the start to
mention a brief case of papers that the suspect neighbor brings home every
night.
7
By the courtesy of the high tribunal, a new evidentiary privilege has been
65. Complaints against lower judges' failure to sense the correct political implication
of such insults and brawls are frequent in the official legal literature. For an example from
recent months, see Spranger & Wunsch, supra note 55, at 270; Streit, Faer einen neuen
Arbeitsstil in der Justiz, 12 N.J. 368 (1958); Streit, Ails den Erfahrungen einer Brigade
im Bezirl Potsdam, 12 N.J. 620 (1958).
66. See, e.g., High Court Judgment of Feb. 11, 1958, confirming a district court judg-
ment sentencing the drunken attacker of a "hero of labor" to eighteen months penal servi-
tude by applying § 19(3) of the Penal Code Amendment Act of Dec. 11, 1957, [1957]
G.B.D.D.R. 645-an aggravated case of state-endangering agitation. 12 N.J. 323 (1958).
For a parallel case involving party-school students, see High Court Judgment of March 21,
1958, 12 N.J. 391 (1958).
67. Lower court proceedings in Streit, Uber die Abrenzung von Kritik und Beleidigung,
10 N.J. 176 (1956) ; High Court Decision of March 2, 1956, id. at 217. For further com-
ment, see id. at 230.
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born, one that does away with the search for truth or falsehood. s "Socially
justified" allegations require no evidence. Further, the "critic" need not bother
to adduce proof of legitimate interest, despite the fact that a defendant in a libel
suit may have to supply such proof even though the formally libelous statements
admittedly be truthful. No "socially justified" informer has to hide his face
in shame; he has done his duty as a patriot and the Government will insist
that the community honor him for undaunted civic devotion.""
To be sure, any government may use, encourage and protect informers. But
to insist that the public lavish praise on them, and to hold them in so high
esteem as to deny the aggrieved individual the right to legal relief from their
abuses, are unusually bizarre procedures. Surely, this brazen "social justifica-
tion" may swell the ranks of informers. But it also may overrrate the malle-
ability of public sentiment. The public's verdict may continue to depend upon
a popular and realistic evaluation of the "critic's" motives or of the cause he
claims to serve.
Public response and civic activity are elusive and hard to come by under the
DDR's unrelenting control. Even so, a shaky pedestal for the volunteer in-
former is a skimpy reward for the Government's continuous effort to produce
such popular participation in the new rule. This failure may be a measure of
the fissure between party theory and public acceptance. Yet, "socially justified"
and extolled as a boon to society, the informer may at least add a more lively
beat and genuine unpredictability to the prearranged motions of the intra-
bureaucratic pendulum.
"SOCIALIST LEGALITY": DOCTRINAL GYRATIONS
Since de-Stalinization was officially inaugurated at the Twentieth Con-
gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, strict observance of "social-
ist legality" has been the theme of many party and government pronouncements
in the DDR no less than in other countries of the Soviet bloc, and the protection
of individual rights has been steadfastly emphasized.7 This purportedly
libertarian philosophy was part of the general reaction to the denounced "ex-
68. Refusing to test the veracity of a defendant's allegation to the effect that plaintiff
had placed milk to be delivered to a dairy center in his toilet cabinet for overnight storage,
the court said that it was the defendant's duty to criticize unhygienic conditions, for improved
hygiene was an element of social progress. See High Court Decision of Sept. 1, 1955,
9 N.J. 634 (1955). Actual presence of unhygienic conditions obviously is immaterial; the
mere possibility of the occurrence is a threat to social progress and must be denounced.
69. The underlying policy and principle has been expressly reaffirmed by a plenary
High Court Decision of Feb. 21, 1958, rendered in pursuance of an extraordinary appeal
of the Attorney General. 12 N.J. 289 (1958). For a comment in a similar direction, see
12 NJ. 315 (1958).
70. Both points were stressed in the Central Committee's report to the congress.
Khrushchev, Otchetnyi doklad TsK KPSS XX s'yezdu partii 109 (1956). The resolution
subsequently adopted by the congress insisted on the "strengthening of Soviet legality" and
urged that the rights of citizens guaranteed by the soviet constitution be "rigorously re-
spected."
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cesses" marking the close of the Stalinist era. Yet, "socialist legality" or
"Soviet legality" (called "revolutionary" in earlier years) is not a recent
innovation, nor is its essential meaning encapsuled in guarantees of personal
security. The concept goes far beyond anti-Stalin polemics.
In the early days of Soviet power, "revolutionary legality" was governed
by the practical requirements of a factual situation. Communist teaching clearly
stated that the working class had taken hold of governmental power and would
use it to further its own interests. Subservience of the government machine
to proletarian class interest was deliberately flaunted; to quite some extent,
legal "formalities" were considered unnecessary. The standard-bearers of the
victorious revolution took pride in divesting power relationships of legal adorn-
nents. "Bourgeois legality" was exposed as a fraudulent maneuver to prevent
the oppressed from recognizing the true balance of power. Law, then, was
just another ideological mask of domination, not necessarily the most important
one.
It was not for abstract philosophical reasons alone that Lenin felt irked by the
emphatic concern for the principles of justice and personal freedom which his
short-term non-Communist People's Commissar for Justice displayed. The
maker of the revolution, who once had practiced civil and criminal law
before Tsarist courts, avowedly had no patience with what to him was a
matter of form without intrinsic value, even though considerations of expediency
made occasional observance of the principle of legality advisible.71 When he in
turn insisted on strict adherence to revolutionary legality, he meant only that
all action emanating from organs of the revolutionary government must follow
the pattern outlined by the central authority and must keep within the rigid
confines of its directives. In essence, the concept of legality was directed against
decentralization of power, uncoordinated action, and spontaneous initiative
beyond that specifically authorized by the party's governing body, or by
agencies to which that organ had delegated power.72
71. One writer has narrated the following episode:
We were discussing a harsh police measure with far-reaching terroristic potentialities.
Lenin resented my opposition to it in the name of revolutionary justice. So I called
out in exasperation, "Then why do we bother with a Commissariat of Justice? Let's
call it frankly the Commissariat for Social Extermization and be done with it !"
Lenin's face suddenly brightened and he replied, "Well put.., that's exactly what
it should be... but we can't say that."
SmNnBEG, THE WORKSHOP OF THE REVOLUToN 145 (1953).
72. By this very token, "revolutionary legality" was to bar abuse of power by individual
government or party officials. In his last active period Lenin repeatedly insisted on com-
batting abuse of power, a task he thought it best to entrust to the prosecutors' offices with
the rigid proviso that all cases of violation be referred to the courts. See Lenin, 0 'dvowinm'
podchi nenii i zakonnisti, 33 SOCHIiiNEIYA 326-30 (4th ed. 1922). Later, in Stalin's inter-
pretation, things were to be simplified to the extreme. In Stalin's view, which until his
death was the law of the land, the history of revolutionary legality was reduced to two
major phases. In the NEP period, when private enterprise was deemed indispensable,
legality was to prevent excessive levies and confiscation of private property, but after the
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In this view, legality is nothing but a technique of domination. The party
alone decides whether law or another instrument of social control should be
given precedence. Law serves the ruling class as a tool for modifying or shap-
ing the development of society, and revolutionary legality stands for planned,
coordinated and disciplined exercise of class rule.
73
Not substantially molded by the institutional setup in which it appears,
legality takes its contours from the class that imposes it. Law is oppressive,
fraudulent and reactionary when in the hands of a class doomed to defeat; it
is an instrument of liberation and progress when serving a class destined to
chart society's future course. Judged by its result rather than the modes of
action it embodies, legality is like the twin but respectable brother of terror
to whom a more specific task is assigned: ensuring the regularity and predicta-
bility of behavior.
According to the Leninist interpretation of the historical process, the prin-
ciple of revolutionary legality takes added validity as a guide to action from
the historical function which it must perform. Seizure of the government
machine by the proletarian vanguard is not just the fortuitous outcome of
transitory factual elements. It is an historically necessary event which marks
a specific stage in the evolution of human society. The revolutionary working
class, the first class to gain scientific insight into the objective laws of social
development, is given the unique chance of adapting its action to historical
necessity. From the laws of history, the workers derive binding norms of
conduct endowed with objective validity. Revolutionary legality sums lp the
set of such norms applicable after the conquest of power and enables the vic-
torious working class to fulfill its historical mission. For those in charge of
making the new system work, legality is more than any single one of many
conflicting directives, more than a warning to those who may be exposed to
the new government's coercive pressure. A manifestation of the objective
historical process, socialist law sets an inescapable behavior pattern for a clearly
defined historical period and prescribes norms of conduct hallowed by recog-
nizable and recognized historical necessities.
Though Lenin did not elaborate the historical role of revolutionary legality,
it is easily deduced from his doctrine of the proletarian revolution. An eminent-
ly pragmatic thinker, however, Lenin always took care not to detract from
completion of the "foundations of socialism" its function had become protection of public
property. This Stalinist gospel was severely taken to task in the very first official comment
released after the Twentieth Congress. It was authoritatively stated that Stalin's version
was neither "exact" nor "comprehensive." Soviet legality was defined as (1) "a precon-
dition of and means to organize and develop societal relations," (2) "the foundation of
governmental discipline" and in addition (3) "it safeguards the rights and legitimate interests
of the Soviet citizens." Strogovich (Corrresponding Member, USSR Academy of Sciences),
Teoreticheskiye voprosy sovetskoi zakondsti, SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, No. 4, at 15
(passed for publication on June 22, 1956).
73. Cf. RUDOLPH[ SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY 43 (1945). For an unusually
frank, unembellished comment from a DDR source, see KLENNER, FORMEN UND BEDEUTUNG
DER GESETZLIcHKEIT ALS EINER METHODE IN DER FUEHRUNG DES KLASSENKAMPFES (1953).
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the sovereign role of the Communist Party, which to him was the only revo-
lutionary instrument conceivable under the laws of history. The supremacy
of the party as the sole fountain of "objectively correct" thought and action
was not to be questioned. Whatever the function of socialist law emanating
from the revolutionary government, no legal norm was ever to supersede
party decisions.
True, requirements of central coordination and disciplined procedure neces-
sitated upholding the validity of unacceptable legal norms not yet formally
abrogated or revised. The legislative prerogative of governmental institu-
tions was to be retained, at least in theory. But even in Lenin's lifetime,
rigorous procedural simplification of law-making to suit party needs made
short shrift of the sanctity of law and reduced to naught whatever hesitant
doctrinal attempts were undertaken to place the law, once promulgated with
the party's approval, above shifting party decisions.
Later, during the three decades of Stalin's increasingly one-man rule, the
art of interpretative distortion and retroactive revision of expectedly authori-
tative pronouncements was developed to a high point. Based on Lenin's teach-
ings about the role of the party in the revolutionary process, an elaborate body
of doctrine was constructed to establish the all-pervasive quality of the prin-
ciple of partiinost'.4 This principle comprehended the unassailable primacy
of party decisions, the inalienable authority of the party as the supreme arbiter
in conflicts of ideas, and the all-embracing nature of the adherent's commitment
to the party.
Party supremacy permitted the Soviet government to turn the balance of
social power upside down and, more than once, to revamp its basic economic
structures. When the uprooting of millions of people generated social malaise,
always a threat to production, when, time and again, the Soviet government
found itself on the lookout for stabilizing factors, the authority of the law was
reinforced and greater importance attached to the historical mission of, and
the element of objective necessity in, socialist legality. Doctrinal disquisitions
on the law's lasting normative validity mushroomed.
Just such a climate prevailed in Russia after the 1956 Twentieth Congress.
"Mistakes" committed in the Stalin era were denounced and the sovereignty
of law was emphatically espoused. Restoration of legality became a mandatory
topic in the official journal of legal doctrine.75 In the issue sent to press on
May 4, 1956, the turn was signalled by Soviet Prosecutor General Rudenko
in person. "In the light of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress," legality
was to become the focal point of all endeavor in the legal sphere."6 More
74. See explanation given in note 1 supra.
75. SOV-rSKOvY GOSUDAUSTVO I PRUvo, published by the A. Ya. Vishinskii Law Institute
of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.
76. Rudenko, Zadachi dal'neishego ukrepleniya sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v svete
reshenii XX s'yezda KPSS, 1956 SovErsKOYE OS mARSrVO I PRAvo, No. 3, at 15. Rudenko
is a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and a member of the USSR
Supreme Soviet.
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specifically, the chief prosecuting official indicated that still greater emphasis
would be placed on the work of the prosecutors' offices, principal custodians of
legality.77 New legislation in the area of substantive criminal law would ease
the prosecutors' job. Laws, in the future, should be made only by legislative
bodies assigned this function by the Soviet Constitution. While there was no
reason to downgrade decisions of the USSR Supreme Court, it was essential
to stress that the court was without power to enact new legal norms or
directives the equivalent of statutes. 78
Six weeks later, the (delayed) next issue of the journal carried a declaration
of theoretical principles in which lack of legal security in everyday life was
directly linked with Stalinism:
An important cause of violations of legality in the past was the cult of
personality. Personality cult is incompatible with the consistently main-
tained legality, for it creates a climate which obstructs vigorous observance
of the law and fosters the tendency of individual law-enforcers to place
themselves above the law instead of obeying it without reservations as
legality demands. 9
True devotion to legality was missing in Soviet life. Many even invoked
Lenin's authority to justify making observance of the law dependent on con-
siderations of usefulness and expediency. But such considerations "can only
imply the useful application to a given case, in conformity with the law of a
provision authorized by law; [they] cannot imply circumvention or violation
of the law."80
Following the lead of the Prosecutor General,8' the journal blamed Soviet
legal theory for having neglected problems of legality. In particular, it attacked
the allegedly "dialectical" denial of the validity of legal norms by the top
legal authority of the bygone Stalinist era, who had asserted that the "dialecti-
cal approach to law interpretation precludes stereotype interpretation and
stereotype application of legal norms."8' 2 Not "flexibility" but "unbending
rigidity" must be displayed in the enforcement of statutes. Participants in a
1954-1955 discussion were castigated for having defended "flexible" attitude,:
Theses absolutely incompatible with actual implementation of legality
are sometimes offered on the pretext that it was necessary to combat
formalism in the application of the law, or that the law had to be treated
dialectically. Whenever it accepts this, the science of law, instead of fight-
ing for the strengthening of legality, embarks on the dangerous venture
of laying the theoretical foundations for permissible departure from the
law.83
77. Id. at 17.
78. Id. at 20.
79. Strogovich, supra note 72, at 16.
80. Id. at 17.
81. Rudenko, supra note 76, at 18.
82. DENIsov, TEORIVA GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA 480 (1948).
83. Strogovich, supra note 72, at 20.
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Many a reiteration followed. By the end of 1956 an editorial restatement
of immediate objectives once more spelled out the implications of the Twentieth
Congress's stand on legality. The editors urged the active defense of the rights
of Soviet citizens, the correction of "the most flagrant violations of Soviet
legality" that had grown out of the "cult of personality," improved legislation,
the codification of existing law, better training of judicial personnel, and clear
demarcation of overlapping jurisdictions.84 Then the tide changed and the
topic was abruptly dropped from the columns of the official law journal.
A different mood prevailed when the discussion flared up anew in March
1957. Violation of legality was no longer the subject of grave misgivings.
WNThat now disturbed the rulers' peace of mind was the apprehension that all
legal norms might be held sacred by the uninitiated. Clarification was supplied
in a signed editorial by the associate chief editor.
On the whole the Communist Party and the Soviet state express cor-
rectly (in legislative acts) the people's conscious thinking; but this does
not imply that every normative act always automatically, as it were, pro-
vides an adequate solution to economic requirements that must be met,
nor that every such act expresses exactly what the people thinks ....
Legal studies, however, have been prone to lift on the shield any judicial
decision, even many an incorrect one, and any legislative act, including
such as had to be rescinded later because of their temporary, transient
nature or because they had been erroneous; theoretical justifications have
been construed to prove that such decisions and acts have been correct
and in accordance with the interest and Will of the people.
Because this objectionable practice defied Lenin's teaching, its discontinuance
was urged. 5
Harping on the mistakes and excesses of the Stalinist era was abandoned,
and the rights of the individual were no longer in the foreground. The party's
stand on law and legal order once more was shifting. Another blackout fol-
lowed. Then the atmospheric change carne into plain view, as so often happens
in the totalitarian realm, in a peripheral piece of doctrinal polemics. Made up
as a special feature, a critical broadside was hurled by a writer of little re-
nown sI" at the very same scholar who the year before had been commissioned
to expound the anti-Stalin theory of legality. This scholar's 1956 book on
procedural law and the evaluation of evidence in criminal trials 87 was severely
criticized for having undialectically drawn a line between the "material truth"
oif factual evidence and the relative validity of judicial evaluation. The dia-
lectical approach, so recently and vigorously condemned, was en vogue again.
84. Editorial, Dal' wesheye ukrepleniye sotsialisticheskoi zakonnasti, 1956 SovTsKoYE
GOSUI.uRiTVO I PRAVO, No. 10, at 3 (printing authorized Dec. 11, 1956).
85. Bratus, Uchit'sya u V.L Lenina reshenyin teoreticheskikh i parkticlheskikh vopro'sov
prava (Editorial), id., April, 1957, at 3, 6.
86. Rix lii, Zaonnst' i istinnost' sudebnogo prigovora, id., July, 1957, at 114.
87. SYROGOViCH, MATERIAL'NAIA ISTINA I SUDEBNCYE DOKAZATEL'STVO V SOVETSKOM
UGOLOVNOU PROTSESSE 1956.
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The last touch was applied-not very gently-in an editorial denouncing
the "antiparty activity" of Kaganovich, Malenkov and Molotov. "Strengthen-
ing of socialist legality" was no longer the focal theme. The headline slogan,
once again fed into courtroom loudspeakers, clamored "for the strengthening
of the Socialist Soviet State under the leadership of the Communist Party." s8
The party, hitherto unmentioned in discussions of the doctrines inaugurated
at the Twentieth Congress, re-emerged overnight as the sole architect and
custodian of socialist legality.89 On behalf of Soviet juridical science, the
editors of the law journal took a solemn oath to obey the decisions of the
Twentieth Congress and carry on unwaveringly the fight against the "luckily
unmasked antiparty group." This, however, was not enough: the science of
law "still owes the party a tremendous debt." "Scholarly juridical literature
has presented but weakly, and has failed to expound elaborately, the directing
of the Communist Party in the construction and functioning of the state, and
• .. as the living foundation of Soviet legal and governmental institutions
and processes." The jurists must do their utmost to redeem this onerous debt.0"
Thus, the widely publicized stress on the role of legality had evaporated.
Official recognition was again given the party's role as the "living foundation"
of law and government. Although the contents of the new rules might well
continue to mark important departures from Stalinist practices-witness the
new criminal code-the rank order of the party as initiator, motor and regulator
of social processes and the legal order as an implementing device emphatically
was reconfirmed.91
In other countries of the Communist bloc, these gyrations of Soviet doctrinal
thought were echoed resoundingly but not followed precisely. What reaches
the consumer at the end of the line is not necessarily a true copy of the original.
Even in the DDR, a faithful adapter, stereotypes already discarded and replaced
in Moscow are used simultaneously with brand new ones. The ensuing con-
fusion tends to make life under the DDR regime uncertain and unpredictable.
Percolating into DDR jurisprudence with little delay, the Soviet legality
course with its apologia of the supremacy of law became the official doctrine by
spring 1956. But only briefly, for the Soviet Union was to shelve it within less
than a year. Still, some legality enthusiasts found enough time to procede so
far as virtually to repudiate the principle of partiinost' (or its German party-
slang equivalent, Parteilichkeit).
88. Editorial, Pod rukovodstvom Kommunisticheskoi partii za dal 'neisheye ukrc-
pleniye Sovetskogo sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva, SovTs oYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO,
Aug., 1957, at 3.
89. Id. at 8-11.
90. Id. at 10.
91. This, however, should not be taken to imply definite abandonment of legality
teachings. It may be taken for granted, for example, that new emphatic admonitions to
observe legality will accompany the turbulent rebuilding of rural party and government
structures set in motion with the abolishment of Machine and Tractor Depots (MTS).
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The most extreme of these views 92 implied that, inasmuch as socialist
legality expressed objective requirements of the historical process, it necessar-
ily limited the choice of ways and means appropriate for attaining society's goals
to those encompassed by established legal norms. In the light of this doctrine,
rules of action should be drawn from normative acts passed by the Govern-
ment's legislative bodies rather than from ad hoc decisions of party bodies.
Correspondingly, judicial interpretation would not be identical with ensuring
that law, or the rationale of its application, met party specifications in the
individual case before the court. Partiinost', under such a theory, could no longer
override the law. It would have to be regarded as inherent in the legal norm,
a quality imparted to the normative act in the lawmaking process by virtue
of the fact that the legislators represented the party in translating the objective
laws of social development into rules applicable to specific situations.
Clearly, this reasoning stripped the party of the power informally to cast
overboard legal norms no longer to its liking. If a legal norm proved a dead
weight because the legislators had misread history's "objective" requirements
or had miscalculated the malleability of social reality, it was up to the legislative
bodies to remove the discrepancy by changing the law.9 3 Intended to curtail
the arbitrariness of party interference, this interpretation disregarded possible
arbitrariness on the part of the lawmaker. It is indeed conceivable that the law-
maker, concerned with his own prestige and position, would, though fully
92. See Artzt (Director, DDR Institute of Civil Law), Zu einigen Fragen der
so-ialistischcn Gesetzlichkeit in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 10 N.J. 581
(1956), where the principle of legality finds consistent affirmation from what may be termed
an "objectivist" or "positivist" point of view. Artzt meanwhile has duly recanted his errors.
He admitted that his teachings as to "a certain independence of the law" and its separation
from the politics of the party are in contradiction with the Marxist-Leninist theories of state
and law. STAATs UND RzcHTSWISSENscHArmICHE KONFMENZ IN BABELSBERG Am 2 & 3
MAI 1958, at 154 (1958).
Of the scores of Soviet and satellite papers on legality that have been translated for DDR
publications, only a few betray an "objectivist" viewpoint. Strongly pointing in this direction
are two papers by Kerimov, Fragen der Theorie der sozialistischen Gesetlichkeit, 11 N.J.
385-390 (1957), and Die wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen der Rechtsschoepfung des Sowjet-
staates, in 6 SA'AT UND REcHrT 580 (1957), both adapted from his Zakoiwdatel'naya
deyatel'vzost' Sovetskogo gosudarstva (1955), a beginner's theoretical inquiry into the legal
structure of Soviet legislative processes, which drew heavy fire during the short-lived era
of legality raptures. See 1956 SOVFTSKOYE GosUDARSTVO I PRAvo, No. 5, at 95-96, 129, 132
No. 9, at 9. A premature forerunner of the 1956 campaign, Kerimov had considerably over-
shot the mark. What was worse, he then misjudged the meaning of the elaborate dressing-
down he had taken. While tuning down, for the German version, the "objectivist" theme,
he unperturbedly went on disparaging lawmaldng by agencies not constitutionally empowered
to legislate. As bad luck would have it, his re-emphasized demand that the legislators-and
they alone-be the ones to correct faulty legislation came out in Germany just in time to
clash with Moscow's renewed oath of allegiance to the party as the "living" sovereign
above the law.
93. Kerimov, Fragen der Theorie der sozialistischen Gesetzlichkeit, 11 N.J. 385, at 387
(1957).
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aware of the discrepancy between norm and reality, nevertheless fail to "put
socialist law in step with life," intransigently use the unrealistic norm as a
whip, and insist on norm-prescribed goals beyond the social energies already
harnessed. Who then would correct the lawmaker?
For obvious reasons, enthusiasm for legality in this extreme form conflicted
with the party's traditional philosophy, in that "historical necessity" here ap-
peared "objectively" expressed by legal norms, not by party action. Essentially,
however, the new doctrine substituting the legislative for the party ma-
chine, merely exchanged one institutional agent of "historical necessity"
for another. The agent, whatever its designation, was still ascribed a
mystical mission in the pursuit of an abstract society's presumed goals, which
in turn were assigned an infinitely higher rank than the interests of indi-
viduals who make up the actual and immediate society.
Still, when legality, no longer seen as a mere shorthand code for class rule,
stands for concrete programs of social and economic action, the individual
is bound to slip in through the back door. When the law serves as the chosen
instrument for making wide-range governmental plans come true, the activity
of the individual must be planned as well; to fulfill plan objectives, the indi-
vidual must have some latitude of action, at least within a sphere circumscribed
by the plan. If he remains passive, actual achievement will fall short of plan
objectives. Accordingly, the individual is theoretically granted certain pre-
rogatives. But, in so far as his area of freedom is wholly directed toward plan
objectives, these prerogatives shrink in practice.
The struggle for the fulfillment of plan objectives, varying but never relax-
ing, holds an entrenched priority. The prime concern of the party and govern-
ment is to overcome all conceivable resistance to the overall program, whether
it originate in recalcitrant moods, individual entanglements, inadequate under-
standing of objectives, or any other retarding factor rooted in the given social
situation. The legal order adapted to this central policy requirement does not em-
phasize protection of the individual against loss of freedom, judicial restraints on
administrative action, legal buttressing of private positions, or guarantees for
droits acquis.
Technological, organizational and manpower bottlenecks constantly delay
and endanger the attainment of objectives set by party and government de-
cisions. Naturally enough, those in power are reluctant to multiply such im-
pediments by lending support and privilege to private interests (with the
exception, of course, of those interests disguised in terms of office authority
and public title). To be sure, individuals may file complaints with hierarchic
superiors and the prosecutor's office will accept requests for the review of
allegedly illegal administrative decisions. 94 But beyond these measures, no
legal remedy to preserve the rights of the individual against the administrative
94. DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FUR RECHTSWISSENSCETAFr, DAS VERWALTUNGSRECHT DER
DEUTSCHFN DEMOKRATISCHEx REPUBLIK, ALLGEmEINER TEL 197 (1957).
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machine exists. Legal norms to protect such rights will remain a dead letter so
long as there are no organized social groups to compel enforcement. In plural-
istic societies, norms become effective to the extent they create subjective
rights that individuals or groups find advantageous to invoke and, if necessary,
uphold in organized action. The interplay of individual, group and govern-
mental interests competitively determines the selection of norms to be enforced.
While the choice hinges on the relative strength of the interests affected, the
function of interpreting disputed norms devolves upon an independent arbiter.
Presumably removed from the interests involved, the judge is expected to
apply standards free from unilateral change by a party to the dispute.
Free competition of ideas and social forces is anathema in a society that
outlaws voluntary organization and substitutes centralized planning and direc-
tion. There, the individual has little chance actively to invoke the protection
of the law, and governmental authorities are the only ones to decide which
norm is to be operative. The abstract thesis that every norm, once enacted, must
be enforced as part of the all-embracing plan of social improvement will not
apply in the absence of organized pressure to protect even those rights that
interfere with the government's monopoly of action. Only a few areas of
norm enforcement are within the individual's reach, and those are mostly
in interpersonal relations. More recently, however, a narrow path has been
opened through which a few individuals can squeeze into the restricted area
where personal freedom is protected from physical encroachment by govern-
ment agencies. 95
The government, whose attention remains fixed on plan objectives, deter-
mines the vigor and intensity with which any chosen legislative program is
made to operate in everyday life. By so doing, the central administration
avoids relegating a wide area of choice to individual departments or regional
agencies, which as a rule are less conscientious and tend to neglect a number
of central projects, especially those that add to their administrative and propa-
ganda chores. 6
As the focal emphasis, if not the very content, of the norm enforcement
changes, the significance of "legality" becomes less evident. The gyrations must
then be rationalized in terms of legality's shifting content. In actual practice,
varying clusters of norms are designated from time to time as "points of concen-
95. This field concerns stricter enforcement of the rules governing preventive detention
of defendants awaiting trial and preliminary arrest. Intrabureaucratic controls were
strengthened in 1956. Melsheimer, Unsere Staatsanwaelte sind Hueter den sozialistishen
Ge;etz;fehkeit, 10 N.J. 225, 226 (1956); Melsheimer, Sozialistische Gesetzlichkeit im
Strafterfahren, 10 N.J. 289, 291 (1956); Herrmann, Voranssetznigen flier die Anordm.q
der (ntersurn,.ngshaft, 10 N.J. 392 (1956).
96. Official opinion contends, for example, that plans for setting up a giant corps of
lay judges met with wide-range apathy at the lower level-that is to say, among municipal
and union officials and local magistrates-and that only unrelenting perserverance on the
part of high judicial authorities made it possible to effectuate the plans. Benjamin, Zn
Fragen der Gesetzlichkeit und der Leitung innerhalb des Justizapparates, 9 N.J. 387 (1955).
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tration" on which law enforcement must be stressed.97 This is part and parcel
of the legal setup as it affects both administrative implementation and judicial
interpretation of the law, provinces largely overlapping in the framework of
socialist legality. The formula, "changing content of legality," entails varia-
tions in the sets of norms singled out for preferential enforcement as well as
interpretative changes in the meaning of specific norms.
The East German version of the Russian accent on legality, whatever its
suspect doctrinal fruit, has not abounded in practical conclusions. As early
as May 1956, when the cult of legality blossomed out in Moscow as a by-
product of de-Stalinization, East Berlin developed an ingeniously simple formula
for combining lip service to legality with a rescue operation to salvage the pri-
macy of nonlegislated norms of unidentified origin. Addressing a national con-
ference of judges and prosecutors, DDR Premier Otto Grotewohl stated that
"democratic legality consists not only of the observance of existing written
law but also of the fact that whatever makes up our socialist standard of right
[unser sozialistisches Recht], and increasingly will be expressed in our statutes,
is now already being put into effect."19 8 Adjustment to policy changes, how-
ever radical, presents no troublesome ideological problems when whatever is
"put into effect" makes law.
"SOCIALIST LEGALITY": ADAPTABLE PRACTICE
In DDR judicial practice, the notion of legality has taken variegated forms.
Until 1953, there were unmistakable efforts to bring as many types of factual
situations as possible under the scope of article 6 of the DDR Constitution,
which penalizes inciting the "boycott" of democratic institutions and organiza-
tions, instigating the assassination of democratic politicians, committing other
acts "directed against the principle of equality," and expressing religious, racial
or national hatred, or militarist propaganda. Instead of enumerating and de-
fining categories of reprehensible political acts, this catalogue supplies defama-
tory labels and relies upon the discretion of the courts to pin an appropriate
name on any individual suspect as inimical to the regime, and to impose any
of the penalties, ranging from a fine to the death penalty, that the Criminal
Code provides. For example, the code was invoked to penalize, under a Soviet
military administration order, the attempted removal of corporation assets
to West Germany.9  A "piece of clearly discernible war propaganda" punish-
able under the code was seen in "idle talk of Jehovah's Witnesses,"100 who thus
97. Present points of concentration are: increased labor productivity, protection of
socialist property, and furtherance of the socialist transformation of agriculture. See
Melsheimer, supra note 58, at 513.
98. Neues Deutschland, May 20, 1956, p. 1.
99. High Court Judgment of Feb. 28, 1951, 1 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts
in Strafsachen 104 (1952).
100. High Court Judgment of Feb. 12, 1952, 2 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts
in Strafsachen 7 (1953).
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faced under the DDR regime a treatment scarcely less ferocious than the one
they had suffered under the Third Reich. During the Korean conflict, "utter-
ances of national hatred" were discovered in rumors about the fate of soldiers
taken prisoners by the North Koreans."" A case arising from a brawl at a
social gathering, in the course of which a Communist was hit for having ranted
against "American dancing," was remanded to a lower court for possible appli-
cation of article 6 on the grounds that, "claiming to have been drunk or suffered
insults, enemies of the established order use the slightest provocation brutally
to assault holders of public office."'10 2
This unmitigated prosecution of actual or imaginary enemies suffered a
major setback in June 1953, when the DDR government, belatedly drawing
conclusions from the political change which had taken place in the Soviet
Union after Stalin's death, inaugurated a "new course." Announced early
in June, the liberalization program was carried beyond its limited objectives
by the force of general unrest culminating in the popular uprising of June 17.
Minister of Justice Max Fechner, subsequently dismissed for excessive liber-
alizing zeal, took sensational steps to prove the sincerity of the new spirit. In
the course of five days-June 15-20-the administration of justice wallowed
in a true orgy of clemency: 2,427 detention orders were cancelled, 1,484
convicts paroled, 1,363 cases held not to merit prosecution, and 927 cases
returned by the courts to the prosecutors' offices for a nolle prosequi decision.1
0 3
Mass application of nol. pros. dismissals merits special attention as a feature
of "socialist legality." Certainly, the nol. pros. technique is not uncommon in
most legal systems. It is principally applied when the prosecution considers
the reprehensible action too unimportant to warrant trial, or too inconsequen-
tial when viewed against the offender's personal background to justify sanctions
which would blot his record. While such benevolence-or just common sense
in human relations-may wipe out the consequences for the offender, it will
not make black white nor erase the fact that an unlawful act has been com-
mitted. Yet this is precisely what DDR jurisprudence seeks to achieve.
Following the model of the USSR Penal Code, DDR jurists have developed
a concept of offense which, in a way, equates the criminal act with its conse-
quences for society. Even though all subjective and objective elements of a
criminal act are present, established judicial doctrine refuses to treat the
incriminating action as an offense unless it entails specific danger to society.
The existence of this danger may be denied because of the insignificant nature
of the interests infringed upon, or because no harm ensued-for society as a
whole, or, because--characteristic twist-either society had changed in: such a
way as to make the still prohibited act socially innocuous or the offender had
101. High Court Judgment of Dec. 7, 1951, 2 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts in
Strafsachen 283 (1953).
102. High Court Judgment of Dec. 9, 1952, 7 N.J. 25 (1952).
103. See Fechner, Der neue Kurs der Regierung und die Aufgaben der $ustis, 7 N.J.
381 (1953).
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experienced so radical a reversal of his personality structure as to purge the
perpetrated wrongdoing of its criminal characteristic.
104
The spy who, in redeeming himself in the eyes of his accusers, has erased his
offense is among the examples most frequently cited to illustrate that trans-
formation of personality which erases the criminal nature of the initially prose-
cuted act. To be sure, the renegade spy turned state's witness will be compen-
sated in one way or another, more often than not in a left-handed way, by any
political system that benefits from his "conversion." But hardly anywhere
will love of the turncoat informer reach the point of ascribing to him, as
does this concept of justice, a moral metamorphosis so sweeping in nature
as to engulf his misdeeds.
The underlying doctrine, which revolves around the "material concept of
the offense," serves the rulers as another tool to punish enemies and reward
friends. In individual instances, it permits the relaxation of an overly harsh
system of criminal law; it shields beneficiaries of the power setup from the
fangs of the law; and it marks the intrusion of unadulterated arbitrariness
into criminal prosecution. Affecting all decisions to withhold the prosecution
of acts punishable under the law, this doctrine jeopardizes legality at one of
its most sensitive spots.10 5
The original Soviet teaching-that danger to society is an essential char-
acteristic of the criminal act-has been subject to criticism in recent debate in
the Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet bloc.10 In the DDR, it
still provides the doctrinal background, in many instances, for refusal to prose-
cute. The converse doctrine, applied as frequently but serving the opposite
purpose, is one of extreme penalization. By this theory, the State holds a
defendant criminally liable for socially damaging consequences of his action
regardless of subjective guilt. Combined, these doctrinal constructs may serve
as a perfect switch for turning criminal sanctions on and off ad lib. Their
contribution to strict observance of legality is as dubious as that of the hodge-
podge of opprobrious labels in article 6 of the constitution.
An abortive attempt to limit the applicability of article 6 was undertaken
in the early days of 1953's "new course." Treading rather cautiously after the
revolt had been crushed by Soviet tanks, the SED central committee decided
on June 21 that, in the prosecution of the rebels, a distinction should be made
between instigators and passive participants inadvertently swept along by the
mainstream of events. Minister of Justice Fechner thereupon decided that
104. For official definitions, see D.UTSCHF-S INSTITUT FuER REcHTWISSENSCHAFr,
op. cit. supra note 33, at 254, 266.
105. Interesting parallels in Nazi practice have been pointed out by LANGE, Dir
ANWENDUNG DES SOVJETISCHEN STRAFRECHTES NACH INHALT UND Foi.Mx IN DER SOWJET-
ZONALEN PRAXIS, ENTIVICIUNGEN DES SOWVjErSTRAFRECHTS UND SEIN EINFLUSS AUF
DIE RECHTSPRECHUNG IN DER SOWJETZONE 55 (1956).
106. Cf. Maurach, Zur Entwicklung des inateriellen Verbrechensbegriffs im sow-
jetischen Strafrecht, 1 REcHT IN OST UiN WEST 137 (1957).
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participation in strikes aimed at economic objectives, conduct which had pro-
vided the background for the uprising, did not fall under the purview of
article 6. The High Court and lower Berlin courts followed suit in sentences
meted out in the latter part of June.10 7 The Minister himself was removed
from office in a matter of days, however, and arrested.'08 He was denounced
as an enemy of the State for having shielded behind the protective mantle of
a justifiable strike a conspiracy to overthrow the "democratic order." The
courts at all levels thereupon began turning out assortments of ruthlessly severe
sentences. They cooperated fully with the newly-appointed Minister of Justice,
Frau Hilde Benjamin, who was to declare with braggadocio that "the judges
had learned within a few days" how to apply the central committee's distinction
between enemy agents and misguided but basically decent worker participants
in the June events.10 9
Reprisals did not clarify the Government's intentions. The dismissed head
of the judiciary was blamed by his successor both for leniency toward enemies
of the State and for inexcusably harsh judgment; he was also accused of having
fostered violations of legality.110 The new Minister of Justice and the High
Court took pains to explain reprisals against the June rebels as a special
emergency measure which in no way detracted from the "new course" as set
forth by the DDR cabinet on June 11.1' Specific legal implications of the
liberalizing liie were not spelled out.
In actual practice, administration of justice continued zigging and zagging
until the spring of 1956. Enforcement of discipline through "educational"
pressure vied with disciplinary reprimands and the much severer arsenal of
sanctions imposed by special legislation or derived from the cure-all provisions
of article 6. At the highest level, efforts were made to have the courts observe
rather subtle criteria for distinguishing individual lapses calling for disciplinary
correction or lesser penal sanctions from deliberate acts undermining the
107. High Court Judgment of June 30, 1953, 7 N.J. 410 (1953); Berlin Municipal Court
Judgments of June 23, 24, 25, 1953, Berlin Appeal Court Judgment of June 26, 1953, 7
N.J. 421 (1953).
108. Fechner was released from prison in 1956 and received a handsome indemnity for
his unwonted sufferings.
109. Benjamin, Unsere Justiaz-ein wirksames Instrument bei der Durchfuehtrung des
neuen Kurses, 7 N.J. 477, 479 (1953).
110. BENJA.lN, DiE HAUPTAUFGABE DER JusruZ BEX DEE DURCHFUEHRUNG DES NEUEN
KuRsEs. UBERAEEITE1Es UND ERGANZTES STENOGRAUM FINER REDE, GEHALTEN voR FUNK-
TICNAEREN DER JusTIz AM 29. AuGUST 1953, at 24 (1953).
111. The DDR Law Journal carried only a few writeups of the cruel sentences
imposed by the court on participants in the June events. And the DDR High Court,
assembled in plenary session on August 29, even set aside a previous judgment of one of
its sections and said that the sentence had been unnecessarily harsh and application of
article 6 unlawful, for its provisions must not be invoked in cases other than those of
"direct interference with the public order." See 3 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts
in Strafsachen 99, 102 (1954).
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foundations of the State. In point of fact, however, decisions as to what
sets of sanctions should apply depended as before on the magistrates' state of
mind and the pressures and campaigns to which they were exposed, rather
than on the character of the offense or the situation of the offender.
112
Increasingly, the courts were directed to combat the continuing exodus from
the DDR. While migration to West Germany was not punishable per se 113
and indirect prosecution was possible only in cases that involved violation of
interzonal trade regulations, "boycott" provisions under article 6 were invoked
against citizens who instigated the moves, those "who know that every member
of the labor force is urgently required for the expansion of the peace econo-
my."114 A lower court went so far as to apply this provision to a lady fortune
teller whose readings were alleged to have inspired her customers to leave
the DDR.n 5
All this changed suddenly, if temporarily, in March 1956, when the spirit
of reform espoused by the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party
began to touch East German society through the medium of the Third Party
Conference of the SED, held March 24-30, 1956.116 Socialist legality became
the slogan of the day. Critics were permitted to say that the "new course" of
1953 had not been consistently steered. The party was urged to abandon
"inordinate over-emphasis on governmental authority" and the pretense that
the judiciary was "absolutely infallible."' 7 Referring to the preceding years,
Minister of Justice Benjamin was later to say that, "as a consequence of the
erroneous doctrine of the exacerbation of the class struggle, emphasis on the
application of this or that norm shifted repeatedly." She added: "While we
112. Comments by Walter Ziegler, High Court Vice-President, summed up practical
advice for the courts on when to apply article 6, and incorporated certain trends which
had crystallized by that time. Ziegler, Verbreche gegen die Deutsche Denokratische
Republik, 9 N.J. 677 (1955). For example, the time had come to dispel the doubts that
had prevailed in the fall of 1953 with respect to pressure in favor of collective farms
which might be exerted on farmers and rural officials. By 1955 even lower courts saw
"sabotage" under article 6 in such crimes against collective enterprise as collective farmers'
private animal holding in excess of a fixed ratio, together with use of collective farm produce
for feeding such "excess" animals, or unsterile vaccination by a veterinarian of livestock
owned by a collective farm. Reports on such lower court rulings in April and June 1955
were reported in 9 N.J. 417-18, 504-05 (1955).
113. Not until December 1957 was unauthorized departure from the DDR made a
punishable offense regardless of destination. See text accompanying note 135 infra.
114. High Court ruling of Jan. 27, 1956, 10 N.J. 99 (1956).
115. Judgment of the District Court of Suhl, Thuringia, April 16, 1956, 10 N.J. 479
(1956).
116. Between national congresses which meet once in three or four years, the SED holds
"conferences," in which the party's governing and functional bodies meet with regional and
district bosses.
117. Schulze, Neve Masstaebe, 10 N.J. 645 (1956). Schulze, the most outspoken inside
critic of governmental policy, was to be severely reprimanded in 1957 for his critical ex-
ploits of 1956. The editors of Neue Justiz were harshly upbraided for having published
Schulze's attack on the party and legal leadership.
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kept within the framework of the law, we still violated legality."" 8 On a
number of specific issues, governmental policy was radically reversed.119
Had the jurists and the party authorities seen the light overnight? Was
legality more than just a way to find a peg-called norm--on which to hang
whatever rules were slated for confirmation by the courts under the latest gov-
ernment instructions as to desirable attitudes? Had criminal law a special job
to perform in society, or was it merely a faint echo of the class struggle? The
Twentieth Congress had explicitly rejected Stalin's contention that the class
struggle was bound to become more intensive and ruthless as a result of the
establishment of the "foundations of socialism in the USSR." Since too great
significance had been attached to the role of criminal law in the regulation of
human conduct, the importance of criminal sanctions was de-emphasized.
Accordingly, DDR legal theorists now found that, while criminality was
related to class struggle in the infinite chain of causal links, many violations
of the criminal law mirrored nothing more than social relationships in which
human beings conducted themselves as individuals rather than as representa-
tives of class interests or class positions. Offenders who committed unlawful
acts as a result of personal entanglements neither visualized nor cared about
the effect of their actions on specific class situations. Accordingly, they should
not be held liable for consequences prejudicial to the conduct of the class
struggle. 120 Views of such an extreme deviationist slant were vented and dis-
cussed in the course of a 1956 public debate on class struggle and the criminal
law.
Applied to political jurisprudence, such views posed dangerous implications.
The scope of the crucial article 6 would be narrowed down to acts inten-
tionally directed at the overthrow of the DDR regime. Those guilty under
the erstwhile official interpretation of various articles 6 offenses-for failure
to meet approved standards of "class consciousness"-could no longer be
prosecuted. It would then be virtually impossible to designate as enemies of
the commonweal, punishable under article 6 regardless of motives and degree
of involvement, persons merely guilty of having run afoul of regulations cover-
118. Benjamin, Fragen des Beweisrechts im Strafprovess, in DEUoSCnES INsTITUT FUER
REcHTSWISSENSCHAFr 107 (1957).
119. The fortune teller's contribution to "escape from the Republic" was dismissed
with contemptuous irony. The High Court quashed the judgment of a lower court which
had sentenced a public transport white-collar employee with good professional contacts
in Western Germany for having advised fellow workers to move to the Federal Republic
where, according to his information, they would fare better. Nor did the High Court find
any "elements" of a hostile act in the defendant's view that every hour one remains in the
DDR was wasted time. See High Court Ruling of Nov. 2, 1956, 10 N.J. 766 (1956).
But a year later, when the political climate and policy towards flight from the DDR
changed again, the ruling became 'wrong and detrimental." Haid, Einige aktuelle Probleme
der staatsanwaltshaftlclhen Arbeit, 11 N.J. 794, 797 (1957).
120. For a summary presentation of this train of thought, see Schuessler, Uber Rechtsver-
letzung und Klassenkampf in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republic, 5 STAAT UND RECHT
825 (1956).
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ing the delivery of farm produce, an increase in work quotas, or an embargo
on emigration.
Predictably, the liberal deviations of 1956 were soon repudiated. The Soviet
bloc's misfortunes in Hungary hastened the resumption of repressive policies.
Those who had questioned the omnipresence of the class struggle in the realm
of criminal law were castigated. Among other things, they were told that it
would be impossible to maintain strict standards of legality unless the criminal
act as such were penalized, irrespective of subtle differences between political
hostility to the established system of government and other asocial attitudes. In
addition, the all-pervasiveness of the class struggle was vigorously reasserted.1 -
Delaying or obstructing the attainment of society's objectives, every criminal
act was bound to influence class relations no matter what the perpetrator
may have had in mind. Intentions and motivations mattered as little as did
the defendant's social background; the concrete facts alone would determine
the category of charges to be preferred.
122
Formal reappraisal of 1956's liberal positions also followed in the wake of
the Hungarian uprising. In January 1957, the thirtieth plenary session of
the SED Central Committee condemned the doctrine that had viewed spon-
taneity and economic self-government as stages in the "withering-away of the
state."'3 It also criticized mistakes in the judicial implementation of decisions
by the Twentieth Congress and the Third Party Conference of the SED, and
deplored the fact that less harsh judicial and penal practice had resulted in
flagging vigilance for reactionary and imperialist subversion. On March 9, the
"boycott" provision of article 6 was invoked to convict a party ideologist for
the attempted revision of party principles and alleged efforts to establish
contacts with Social-Denocrats. 12 4 The judiciary was sternly admonished to
heed "warning signals" from the "working class," reportedly indignant over
the recent leniency in sentencing policy.
12
During the summer months of 1957, even more persistent criticism was
directed at "liberalism" and "subjectivism," judges were taken to task for
failing to study the debates and conclusions of the January meeting of the
121. "A simplified and vulgarized class struggle discussion" was the verdict oi Attornce
General Ernst Melsheimer when drawing up his list of particulars against the recent
"revisionism." Melsheimer, Das Strafrechtsergaenz;itgsgeset--eih, Gesetz dcr sozialisti-
schen Demokratie, 12 N.J. 42 (1958).
122. KLASSENKAMPF UND STRAFRECHT. PROToroLL EINER TAGUNG DER ABTEILL'NG
STRAFRECHT DES DEUTSCHEN INSTITUTS FUR RECHTSVWISSENSCRAFT IN BRLIN AM 16.
NovEaiBER 1956 (1956).
123. The time apparently had come to make use of the formula prematurely coined
by Minister of Justice Benjamin the year before, which invited the courts "to make decisions
independently from local influences but without underestimating local points of concentration
of the class struggle." Her speech of April 16, 1956, is reported in 10 N.J. 259, 260 (1956).
124. See excerpts from the Harich judgment in 11 N.J. 166-70 (1957).
125. Editorial, Nach dem 30. Plenum des Zentralkomitees der SED, 11 N.J. 129 (1957).
Criminal law theoreticians then worked overtime to show the dangers of subjectivism
in criminal law and to draw up an impressive list of early culprits, starting with von Liszt.
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central committee thoroughly enough. The principle of "Parteilichkeit"12 6
in judicial decisions was given new emphasis and was distinctly contrasted
with "methods of interpretation based on formal logic.' 127 In October 1957,
SED boss Ulbricht once more endorsed the widest possible application of
article 6 in redefining the area of freedom in the DDR. Freedom, in this
version, ends "where an action benefits NATO and Western revenge mongers
or violates the laws of the Republic.'
128
By late spring 1958, "impartial" application of the law had become the
deadliest reproach which might be levied against a member of the judiciary,
and "Parteilichkeit," together with the fight against revisionism, was the pass-
word on everybody's tongue. Legality, while not entirely smothered in theory,
now is invariably coupled in an indissoluble "dialectical unity" with "Partei-
lichkeit." 29
The end of the 1956 trend resembled a rout. The treatment given the draft
(if a reform of criminal procedure submitted by a special commission appointed
at the height of the liberalization wave was characteristic. The Minister of
justice went so far as to deny that any basic reforms had been included in the
commission's terms of reference. The need for a revision of criminal procedure
was refuted point by point. Among the public's major grievances had been
the persistent use in trials of testimony given before the police, a practice based
on section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This section implied that,
in the event of discrepancies between a defendant's trial testimony and his
statements made before police officials, police transcripts were to be read in
court. While it was up to the court to choose the most believable verson, 30
judges generally tended to give the benefit of the doubt to testimony supplied
by police interrogators.'3L The commission had suggested a complete reversal
of tlis practice. The Minister of justice, the Attorney General and the highest
judicial officer now insisted, however, that improvements in recording tech-
niques used by the police would be sufficient; no change of the law was re-
quired.1a2
126. This German slang term denotes partiinwst'.
127. 11 N.J. 493 (1957). See also Benjamin, Die Schoeffenwahlen 1958, Neues Deutsch-
land, Oct. 31, 1957, p. 1. For official comment on the Thirtieth Plenary Session, see Der
Kampf gegen buergerliche Ideologie und Revisionismus, 12 EINHEIT ZEITscHru1r FUER
THEORIE UND PRAUxS DES WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN SozmAmsmsus 129, 136 (1957).
128. Address by Walter Ulbricht at the Thirty-third Plenary Session of the SED
Central Committee, Neues Deutschland, Oct. 20, 1957, special section (Beilage), p. 30.
129. For some official statements, see Benjamin, Die dialektische Ejuheit von
Gesetclichkeit und Parteilichkeit durchsetzen!, 12 N.J. 365 (1958); Streit, Fuer elen
ituen 4Arbeitsstil in- der Justi, 12 N.J. 368 (1958).
130. Police officers who have taken pretrial testimony generally are not heard by the
court and are not cross-examined. Circumstances surrounding pretrial interrogations can
hardly be elicited within the normal procedural framework.
131. This had been brought out by many DDR lawyers. See Benjamin, Fragen des
Beweisrechts im Strafprozess, in DEUTSCHES IN¢sTrUr FlIER RECHTWISSENSCHAFT, 84, 87,
174 (1957).
132. Editorial, Ergebnisse der Diskussion ueber die Anwendung der STPO, 11 N.J.
601, 605 (1957).
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The upshot a few months later was a group of amendments which, anion-
other things, finally defined the offenses catalogued in, or just shoved under
the umbrella of, article 6. One commentator, writing in the period of reaction
against the 1956 "revisionism," insisted that the amendments add nothing
fundamentally new and do not put the organs of criminal repression before
terra incognita. 133 Despite its political coloring, this evaluation, with one ex-
ception, is generally correct. The touchy problem of flight from the DDR, an
issue disagreeable both from the viewpoint of the prestige of the regime and for
the dilemma caused by the need to encourage the lost sheep's return into the
fold, is now resolutely solved by treating both the fact of flight and most cases
of incitement to flee the DDR as punishable crimes against the State. In line
with SED boss Ulbricht's injunction that leaving the DDR connotes treason
against the interest of the people, unauthorized emigration from the DDR is
now subject to a maximum of three years' imprisonment.13 4  Furthermore,
agents who, in serving a "mercenary" military establishment or recruiting for
business enterprises, induce people to flee are liable to penal servitude. Vho-
ever by promises, threats, or misrepresentations incites a youthful person, an
apprentice, or a person with special professional qualifications to leave the
DDR is liable to a minimum of six months' imprisonment.135 With a touch
of involuntary humor, the commentator adds that incitement grounded on
family or sexual relations is not encompassed by the criminal law. 130
133. Renneberg, Die neuen Strafbestimmungen zumn Schutze der deutschcn dcmo-
kratischen Republik, 12 N.J. 7 (1953). The decisions of the High Court on state security
matters during the first half of 1958 bear out this contention. While substituting the no-
menclature of the Penal Code Amendment Act-officially styled the milder law% and hence
retroactively applicable-for article 6 of the constitution, the court has in no instance found
it necessary to change the sentence as determined by the lower court, on the basis of article
6. See, for example, the latest reported Jehovah's Witnesses case, where the espionage
and agitators provisions of §§ 14 and 19 of the P.C.A.A. are substituted for article 6 of
the constitution. High Court Decision of Feb. 28, 1958, 12 N.J. 248 (1958).
134. Amendment to Passport Law § 8, [1957] G.B.D.D.R. 650 (Dec. 11). Cesare
Beccaria, in chapter 32 of his essay on Crime and Punishment, uses the example of the
uselessness of penal provisions against emigration in order to show the similar foolishness
of attempts to punish suicide. While part of his argument is dated-the subject of the
eighteenth-century Hapsburg monarchy did not foresee the effectiveness and ruthlessness
of the twentieth-century totalitarian regimes-his insistence on the difficulty arising from
punishing returning "criminals" still applies to modern totalitarian governments which,
like many of their mercantilist predecessors, want to induce able-bodied and skilled nationals
to return to the fold.
135. Penal Code Amendment Act of Dec. 11, 1957, § 21, [1957] G.B.D.D.R. 643. The
vice president of the High Court recently gave a rather extensive interpretation of both
the meaning of inducement to flee and an aggravated case of inducement. His understanding
of the needs of "the present class struggle situation" would qualify inducement by Jehovah's
Witnesses or an evangelical academy under § 21 (1).1. Jahn, Einige Fragen der Verlitung
zum Verlassen der DDR, 12 N.J. 840, 843 (1958).
136. Renneberg, Die neven Strafbestimmungen rum Schutze der deutschen demokrati-
schen Republik, 12 N.J. 7, 11 (1958).
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In most other respects, the amendments restate pre-existing concepts em-
ployed to interpret the nomenclature of article 6. Each theoretical term is
carefully conceived to allow full latitude for the ever-shifting needs expressed
in changing "points of concentration."
The material concept of the offense is now a construct formally enshrined
in the DDR criminal law.' 3 7 Characteristic of the state of mind with which
the authorities approach the job of reformulating the state security legislation
is the law governing illicit relations with organizations the DDR deems hostile.
While the corresponding West German enactment, 38 as construed in the cele-
brated John and Agartz cases, 139 conditions punishability on a finding that
the defendant has become an instrument of the hostile power, the DDR enact-
ment omits such qualifications. As the official commentator makes quite clear,
establishment of contacts for purely private purposes (registration, gathering
of information) unrelated to any political rule or activity would come within
its prohibition and would be punishable by a maximum of three years' im-
prisonment. 140 Along with the typically totalitarian 6ffense of "diversion -
permitting a great number of common crimes to be identified as offenses against
the state security-reappears the concept of "sabotage." It is defined as "im-
peding the work of governmental and affiliated organizations for the purpose
of creating disturbances to destroy or undermine socialist reconstruction.'
4 1
Perpetrated by acts of commission such as misallocation of labor, or acts of
omission such as negligence in the exercise of official duties, sabotage is pun-
ishable with penal servitude. Espionage, treason, diversion and sabotage may
in a number of specifically enumerated circumstances be punished with penal
servitude for life, or with death. The new formulation will, as East German
comments emphasize, exclude these extreme penalties in all other cases.
1 42
This "advantage" is obliterated by the fact that among the aggravated cir-
137. Penal Code Amendment Act § 8. See text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
Moreover courts are now at liberty to pass conditional sentences of a maximum of two
years' imprisonment; they also may substitute "public censure," either alone or in con-
junction with a fine for short-term prison sentences. P.C.A.A. §§ 1-6. However, these
provisions, issued during a period of sharp reaction against all forms of revisionism and
liberalism, are officially interpreted in a rather restrictive manner. The High Court and
administration are concerned to narrow down their field of application and oppose lower
court practices of resorting to them routinely (considered a manifestation of the presently
much-vituperated practice of "sentencing with a discount"). See Renneberg, Die neuen
Strafarten in der Praxis imserer Gerichte, 12 N.J. 372 (1958).
138. Penal Code § 100d(2).
139. Otto John, Dec. 22, 1956, 2 St E 15/56 (Bundesgerichtshof 3. Strafsenat) ; Viktor
Agartz, Dec. 13, 1957, 1 St. E 8/57 (Bundesgerichtshof 3. Strafsenat), 2 Hochrerrat mid
Staatsgefihrdung, Urteile des Bundesgerichtshofs 77, 132 (1958) (John); id. at 187, 220
(Agartz).
140. Penal Code Amendment Act § 16; Renneberg, Die neuen Strafbestbmnungen sum
Schutze der deutschen demokratischen Republik, 12 N.J. 7, 9 (1958).
141. Penal Code Amendment Act §§ 22, 23.
142. Penal Code Amendment Act § 24; Lekschas, Das STEG--das mildere Gesetz
im VerhacItnis --i Art 6 der Verfassung, 12 N.J. 84 (1958).
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cumstances allowing the imposition of these penalties are found two definitions
sufficiently vague to constitute a blank check: violation of a relationship of
trust and the existence of a period of increased danger for the DDR. 4"
Difficulties of interpretation have arisen in applying the penal code amend-
ments to hostile propaganda. Criteria are lacking for distinguishing between
mere defamation of the state 144 and state-endangering threats and agitation. 
14
1
At the height of the early 1958 movement against revisionism, penal policy
veered sharply toward finding calculated hostility and intended, or at least
probable, sedition in critical behavior that merely expressed personal dis-
pleasure. 140 More recently, the counsel of moderation has prevailed. The evalu-
ation sheets that all courts must send to the Ministry of Justice in connection
with any case involving questions of state security are being used to direct
lower organs toward educational rather than penal treatment of the ill-
tempered. 147  In state-defamation cases, the courts have frequently denied
the very punishability of the act because a prerequisite of the material concept
of the offense-danger to the public at large-is missing.148 Or, the court may
forego punishment in response to a fundamental change in the offender's atti-
tude.149 Whether this policy is anything more than an attempt to rescue courts
from swamps of trivialities in which friends of the regime or political neutrals 150
become mired as often as do the more cautious agents of the class enemy cannot
now be ascertained.
Conceivably, a new shift in tenor might be introduced under cover of the
present campaign, initiated at the fifth SED congress, to emulate Soviet en-
'deavors toward all-embracing codification. 1 1 But even if the codification
campaign should signify that the high tide of the battle against revisionism is
receding, the limited meaning of "formulated legal enactments"'112 within the
143. Penal Code Amendment Act § 24(2)(d)-(e).
144. Defamation may incur no more than two years' imprisonment. Penal Code Amend-
ment Act § 20.
145. Such crimes are punishable by imprisonment and, in aggravated cases, penal
servitude. Penal Code Amendment Act § 19.
146. See cases cited note 66 srupra.
147. Leim, Abgren-ung der Hete von der Staatsverleuzndung, 12 N.J. 694 (195,).
148. High Court Judgment of Sept. 16, 1958, 12 N.J. 716 (1958) (complaints over
delivery quotas and comparisons between attitudes of present agricultural authorities and
behavior of former estate owners judged to be without damaging consequences and to
fall under § 8 of the Penal Code Amendment Act).
149. Judgments of the District Court of Dresden, Aug. 8, 1958, 12 N.J. 6S0 (1058),
and of a local court in Riesa, Sept. 5, 1958, 12 N.J. 681 (1958).
150. See High Court Judgments of Sept. 5, 1958 (jokes hostile to regime, if reported
disapprovingly to third person, held not to constitute state-endangering threat), and July
25, 1958 (importation of hostile periodicals by politically inactive individual does not
establish presumption of intention to circulate such material among wider circles, and
therefore held not punishable as state-endangering threat), 12 N.J. 717 (1958).
151. Buettner, Die Aufgabe der Gesetzgebung im Kampf lom den Sieg des Sozialisinus
in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 7 STAAT UND RECHT 968 (1958).
152. Id. at 983.
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framework of a social order intent on both speedy institutional change and, more
significantly, on alteration of the consciousness structure of its human material,
is overwhelmingly important. So long as the ministries and the central appa-
ratus of the party itself maintain their tight check on both prosecution and court
work,158 the ebb and flow of changing slogans only show the extent to which
the law remains at the disposal of part), authority.
CONCLUSION
In the superficially deceptive propensity of recent Communist legal doctrine
to emphasize the normative element,154 an anxious maintenance of the closest
possible relation between the legal norm and its creator and protector, the party-
controlled government machine, displays traits reminiscent of legal positivism.
The resemblance is superficial, however. Under the East German system, the
sovereign does not use a comprehensive and tightly knit body of law as his main
channel of communication with the subjects, nor are the sovereign's orders neces-
sarily issued by functionally competent authorities with a constitutionally defined
jurisdiction. What the lower-level authorities have as mandatory guides may
be a law, an administrative order, a resolution passed by a party body, a public
speech delivered by a ranking official, an article published in a party publication,
or a lecture on a fine point of doctrine. Such documents, only a few of which
are officially classified as "normative acts," may either provide a high degree of
specificity, or-more often-leave concretization to the executive agencies in
charge. The lower-level office holder will be well advised to .watch out con-
stantly for reactions of the authorized primary interpreter in order to protect
himself and assure obedience from his subordinates. Administrative objectives
may be indicated by indirection, as in the criticism of operational mistakes or the
designation of new "points of concentration."
This elastic system, which more often than not is at cross purposes with strict
observance of legality, infuses a calculated element of specificity. It grants those
153. See Benjamin, Vorn IV. zum V. Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einlheitspartei
Deutsehlands, 12 N.J. 437, 438 (1958). In her evaluation of the tasks set by the SED fifth
party congress, she reemphasizes the need for central direction of the courts' work. At any
rate, the recent discussion in Russia of the locus and extent of court supervision and the ensu-
ing reformulation of article 10 of the Principles of Criminal Procedure, though initially
reported in 6 RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHER INFOR-MATIONSDIENST 341 (1957), so far has
found no receptive ear in Eastern Germany. For an English version of this discussion, see
Judicial ,xS E.recutive Supervision Over the Courts, 10 THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
Pumss, No. 2U, at 6 (1958). As recently as 1957, Minister of Justice Benjamin and other
members of her ministry, citing the Czech example, have insisted on the need for continued
direction of the courts by the Ministry of Justice, conditioned as it is by the concrete
economic and political situation of East Germany, circumstances deemed to be at variance
with those in the Soviet Union. Benjamin, Aktuelle Fragen der Gerichtsorgauisation, in
STAAT uND REcHT i.I LIcHTE DES GROSSEN OKTOBER 189 (1957); Ostmann, Ueber die
Organisation der Justizverwaltung, 11 N.J. 357 (1957).
154 DAVID & HAZARD, 1 LE DROIT SOVIETIQUE 78 (1954); KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST
THEORY or LAW 129 (1955).
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in power the opportunity to single out for condemnation whichever specific ap-
proach they may deem inopportune. As instruments of command, the sovereign
uses vituperation, criticism and exhortation as much as he does clear-cut orders
or formalized laws setting forth generalized rules of conduct. The backfiring of
individual decisions may always be blamed on lower echelons whose job it is
to institutionalize and individualize policies laid down by a superior agency.
The formal law on the statute books is overgrown with numerous interpreta-
tive glosses of varying origin and age, yet as authoritative as the law itself.
The judge-administrator must follow the latest signals from above. Simultane-
ously, he is expected to accommodate possible reactions of an undefined grass-
roots public, though not in the traditional way of striking a balance between
norm requirements and the divergent interests of affected parties. Instead, his
is the job of an errand boy ordered to deliver a letter and to bring back a receipt
signed by the addressee. The receipt symbolizes the widely advertised "educa-
tional" function of the law. While there is no doubt that the government pro-
gram will be carried out regardless of public volition, the official-no matter
where he stands in the chain of command-is under the obligation to transform
the citizens' passive obedience or recalcitrant obtuseness into cheerful coopera-
tion.
The essence of "socialist legality," then, is guaranteeing that orders and
signals are unfailingly observed at all subordinate levels. A measure of obedi-
ence may be ensured by establishing regular and permanent channels for imple-
mentation; this may even include procedures permitting the individual to react
freely within such limits as suit the government's convenience and tally with the
objectives to be obtained. But it is the objectives which count, not any degree
of harmony between what the government wants and what grows out of institu-
tional or legal positions accorded individuals or groups. When policies and official
interpretations change, legality attaches to the new task at hand. Under no
condition is it called upon to mediate between today's objectives of the sovereign
and yesterday's expectations of the subject. At the service of a fixed policy
rather than as a purveyor of societal equilibrium, legality represents a marriage
between law and efficiency drive. It stands for the avoidance of lost motions;
it becomes the government's whip to secure the attainment of top-priority
goals.
Under such circumstances, what can be the nature of the law? No doubt,
the SED and DDR government are fully aware of the beneficial effect guaran-
teed expectations have on all factors which make the individual maximally
cooperative with his neighbors and the authorities. A great number of initia-
tives formalized in legal enactments might be adduced to show how laboriously
the various DDR administrations have toiled to produce a maximum of such
satisfactions. 155 If the judge had adequate standing in the community to pro-
155. The quest for individual security was stressed in a recent attempt to bring some
order into the rather chaotic business of norm creation. See Gentz, Zit einigen Grundsaetzen
der Rechtsetzung, 12 N.J. 225-30 (1958).
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gress from individualizing these isolated norm complexes to independently
deciding upon their respective priorities, he might help to create a longer-
range balance between the claims of the individuals and those of the State.
At the present stage of the DDR society, however, the problem simply does not
present itself in such terms. The regime simultaneously assumes too many
new ventures and faces or, at times, intentionally conjures up too many prob-
lems, to be able to allow anyone outside its political leadership to decide on the
elements which should enter the momentary balance between the requirements
of the regime and the allowable satisfactions of the citizenry. When the regime's
major goals have been fulfilled and its spiritual and social dominion safely
anchored, the eternal guard against individual slackening may be relaxed-
and a referee allowed to mark points for both sides. Until that day, however,
the judge remains a simple party servant correctly called by the regime itself
"fuctionary of the apparatus of justice." Like his peers in other departments,
he may become tired or too sympathetic with the stragglers in whom he recog-
nizes his own image. Nevertheless, so long as the political front line is moving
and the chow line forming at the rear, he falls in step. Thus, the variables in
the guessing game called interpretation of the law reduce themselves rather
drastically to the shifting policies of the Communist regime.
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